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This thesis presents a test suite's design and development that can easily integrate Arm 
Cortex-M, specifically the STMicroelectronics STM32-range, into the SEE test environment 
at iThemba Labs with minimal effort from the testers. It can also help local satellite designers 
verify the resistivity of their designs to Single Event Effects (SEE), even with minimal, or 
no, SEE test data for their specific Device-Under-Test (DUT). A concept design for such a 
system is done, and an iterative approach is followed to implement this system. The validity 
of using JTAG to extract or inject data into the DUTs is investigated. A custom JTAG 
driver is reverse-engineered and implemented to be able to use JTAG to quickly extract data 
from a DUT to perform low-level data extraction to pinpoint SEE induced errors, or inject 
data into a DUT to emulate a SEE test environment and to verify mitigation techniques 
and system responses before SEE testing. A test station, utilising a Raspberry Pi, is designed 
to interface with the DUT while inside the SEE test radiation vault and has the option of 
controlling power to the DUT as well. A monitoring station is also implemented that allows 
the tester to interface to the test station from a computer over ethernet, enabling safe 
operation of the test station and DUT from outside the vault. The design is easily changeable 
to allow for different testing styles or DUTs. Before the final iteration, it was also subjected 
to a real SEE test at iThemba Labs to verify its effectiveness. A scripting ability was also 
added, allowing for automated tests that can be useful to increase testers' effectiveness during 
SEE testing or to use fault injection to determine areas sensitive to errors inside DUT 
implementations or to test the effectiveness of implemented mitigation techniques. 
 
  







Hierdie tesis detaileer die ontwerp en implementering van ‘n toets stelsel wat maklik gebruik 
kan word om Arm Cortex-M, en spesifiek die STMicroelectronics STM32-familie, 
mikroverwerkers te integreer in die Enkel Gebeurtenis Effek (EGE) toetsomgewing by 
iThemba LABS, met minimale moeite en veranderinge deur toetsers. Dit kan ook gebruik 
word deur plaaslike satelliet ontwerpers om die weerstand van hulle ontwerpe teen EGE 
meer effektief te verifieer, selfs met geen of minimale beskikbare EGE toetsdata vir die 
spesifieke Toestel-Onder-Toets (TOT). ’n Konsep ontwerp vir so ’n stesel word gedoen, en 
’n iteratiewe ontwerp implementering word gevolg om die stelsel op die been te kry. Die 
geldigheid van JTAG om data te onttrek of in te voeg na die interne componente van die 
TOT word ondersoek, en ’n JTAG drywer word ontwerp en gebruik om vinnig data te lees 
vanaf ’n TOT vir lae-vlak fout analise om EGE foute presies op te spoor, of om data in te 
ent om die effekte van die EGE toets omgewing te emuleer en om toegepaste mitigasie 
tegnieke se effektiwiteit te bepaal en die stelsel reaksies te karakteriseer voor EGE toetsing 
plaasvind. ’n Toetsstasie, wat gebruik maak van ’n Raspberry Pi, word ontwerp wat kan 
kommunikeer met die TOT terwyl beide in die EGE toets radiasie kluis is. Die toetsstasie 
kan ook die krag toevoer na die TOT beheer. ’n Monitor-stasie word ook geimplementeer 
wat die toetser toelaat om deur middel van ’n rekenaar via ethernet te koppel aan die 
toetsstasie vir veilige beheer oor die toetsstasie en die TOT vanaf buite die kluis. Die maklik-
veranderbare ontwerp maak voorsiening vir verskillende toets-style of TOTs, en voor die 
finale iterasie word die stelsel ook blootgestel aan ’n EGE toets by iThemba LABS om die 
stelsel effektiwiteit te bepaal. ’n Skrip-vermoë was ook bygevoeg wat voorsiening maak vir 
outomatiese toetsing, wat waarde kan byvoeg vir toetsers gedurende EGE toetsing, of deur 
fout inenting te gebruik om sensitiewe areas vir EGE effekte binne-in die TOT te bepaal. 
Dit kan ook help om te verifieer of geimplementeerde mitigasie tegnieke werk.  







I want to thank my supervisor, Dr A. Barnard, for his insight, assistance, guidance and 
wisdom. I would also like to thank my family for their unwavering encouragement, especially 
during the Covid-19 lockdown.  







Plagiarism Declaration .......................................................................................................... i 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii 
Uittreksel ............................................................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. iv 
Contents ............................................................................................................................... v 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... x 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xii 
Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... xiii 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The Growth of South African micro-and nanosatellites .............................................. 1 
1.2 The need for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf components .................................................. 2 
1.3 Ionising radiation testing ............................................................................................ 3 
1.4 The need for more effective testing methodologies ...................................................... 4 
1.5 Problem statements and research questions ................................................................ 4 
1.6 Document Layout ....................................................................................................... 5 
2. Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 7 
2.1 Brief introduction to the effects of ionising radiation in semiconductors ..................... 7 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
vi 
2.2 Total Ionising Dose testing ......................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Single-Event Effect Testing Overview ......................................................................... 9 
2.3.1 Important definitions ............................................................................................ 9 
2.3.2 Types of SEE ...................................................................................................... 10 
2.3.3 SEE testing variations ........................................................................................ 11 
2.4 SEE Testing, in a South African context .................................................................. 14 
2.4.1 General Testing Standards .................................................................................. 14 
2.4.2 Testing in a South African context ..................................................................... 14 
2.4.3 Test setup and procedure at iThemba LABS ...................................................... 15 
2.5 Microcontroller Technologies..................................................................................... 17 
2.5.1 Microcontroller Selection ..................................................................................... 18 
2.5.2 Peripherals .......................................................................................................... 20 
2.5.3 Expandability to other MCUs ............................................................................. 24 
2.5.4 JTAG .................................................................................................................. 25 
2.6 Fault Injection .......................................................................................................... 26 
2.6.1 Fault Injection Techniques .................................................................................. 27 
2.6.2 Sensible Fault Injection for the South African Context ...................................... 29 
2.7 MCU SEE Testing .................................................................................................... 29 
2.7.1 Previous SEE MCU testing ................................................................................. 30 
2.7.2 MCU Testing Approaches ................................................................................... 31 
2.8 Summary ................................................................................................................... 32 
3. Concept Design ............................................................................................................ 33 
3.1 SEE Test Suite Design Drivers ................................................................................. 33 
3.2 Interfacing the DUT ................................................................................................. 35 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
vii 
3.2.1 DUT communication options .............................................................................. 35 
3.2.2 Onboard testing .................................................................................................. 38 
3.3 Test Suite Adaptability ............................................................................................. 42 
3.3.1 Programming Languages ..................................................................................... 43 
3.3.2 Test Configurability ............................................................................................ 43 
3.3.3 JTAG Drivers ..................................................................................................... 44 
3.3.4 Hardware Adaptations ........................................................................................ 44 
3.4 Testing Station ......................................................................................................... 44 
3.5 Monitoring Station .................................................................................................... 45 
3.6 Iterative Design Approach ........................................................................................ 45 
4. Iteration 1: Proof of Concept ....................................................................................... 46 
4.1 Description of Iteration ............................................................................................. 46 
4.2 DUT configuration .................................................................................................... 47 
4.3 Test Station .............................................................................................................. 47 
4.3.1 UART communication ........................................................................................ 48 
4.3.2 Implementation of fault detection and injection.................................................. 49 
4.4 Testing the POC ....................................................................................................... 52 
4.4.1 Functionality Testing .......................................................................................... 52 
4.4.2 Speed Testing ...................................................................................................... 53 
4.5 Analysis of the tests .................................................................................................. 53 
4.5.1 Functionality analysis ......................................................................................... 53 
4.5.2 Speed analysis ..................................................................................................... 54 
4.5 The conclusion from the POC ................................................................................... 56 
4.6 Improvements for the next iteration ......................................................................... 56 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
viii 
5. Iteration 2: Getting test-ready ..................................................................................... 57 
5.1 Description of Iteration ............................................................................................. 57 
5.2 Custom JTAG Driver ............................................................................................... 58 
5.2.1 Implementation ................................................................................................... 59 
5.2.2 Analysis .............................................................................................................. 60 
5.3 Test Station Design ................................................................................................... 61 
5.3.1 Hardware protection ........................................................................................... 62 
5.3.2 Ethernet Connection ........................................................................................... 65 
5.3.3 Software .............................................................................................................. 65 
5.4 Monitoring Station .................................................................................................... 67 
5.4.1 SSH Communication ........................................................................................... 68 
5.4.2 Graphical User Interface ..................................................................................... 68 
5.5 Testing at iTL ........................................................................................................... 69 
5.5.1 Radiation Test Goals .......................................................................................... 69 
5.5.2 Radiation Test Plan ............................................................................................ 70 
5.5.3 The Test ............................................................................................................. 71 
5.5.4 Testing Issues ...................................................................................................... 72 
5.6 Analysis of Iteration 2 ............................................................................................... 73 
6. Iteration 3: The Improved Experience ......................................................................... 74 
6.1 Description of Iteration ............................................................................................. 74 
6.2 SSH Communication ................................................................................................. 75 
6.3 Graphical User Interface ........................................................................................... 77 
6.4 Scripting .................................................................................................................... 79 
6.5 Analysis of Iteration 3 ............................................................................................... 80 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
ix 
7. Fault Injection ............................................................................................................. 82 
7.1 Beam simulation ....................................................................................................... 82 
7.2 General Firmware Mitigation .................................................................................... 84 
8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 87 
8.1 Summary of work ...................................................................................................... 87 
8.2 Answering the research questions .............................................................................. 89 
8.2.1 Which COTS MCUs should the local SEE testing be focused on? ...................... 89 
8.2.2 How can effective, low-level microprocessor SEE testing be integrated into the iTL 
environment? ............................................................................................................... 90 
8.2.3 How can tools like fault injection be used to help testers prepare for SEE testing 
and verify their mitigation techniques? ....................................................................... 90 
8.3 Improvements and recommendations ........................................................................ 90 
9. Appendices .................................................................................................................. 92 
Appendix A – Fluence Data for 29 January 2020 ........................................................... 92 
Appendix B – Final Implementation APIs.................................................................... 107 
State Machine ............................................................................................................ 107 
UART Receive........................................................................................................... 108 
Logger ........................................................................................................................ 108 
UART Transmit ........................................................................................................ 109 
JTAG Driver ............................................................................................................. 110 
GPIO ......................................................................................................................... 111 
Device ........................................................................................................................ 111 
10. References .............................................................................................................. 112 
 
  




List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 2-1 A representation of an SEU strike [17] ............................................................. 11 
Figure 2-2 Vault setup for SEE testing at iTL ................................................................... 16 
Figure 2-3 UART communication timing diagram example ............................................... 21 
Figure 2-4 CAN Communication timing diagram example [40] .......................................... 22 
Figure 2-5 Typical CAN message structure [39] ................................................................. 22 
Figure 2-6 SPI connection layout [43] ................................................................................ 23 
Figure 2-7 Typical I2C message structure [45] ................................................................... 23 
Figure 2-8 Representation of ADC discretization [47] ........................................................ 24 
Figure 2-9 Included ST-Link JTAG programmer on MCU development board ................. 26 
Figure 3-1 Standard JTAG connection and daisy chaining. ............................................... 37 
Figure 3-2 ADC voltage divider ......................................................................................... 39 
Figure 4-1 The connections between the PC and the DUT ................................................ 47 
Figure 4-2 The operation of the ST-Link controller module ............................................... 50 
Figure 4-3 POC GUI .......................................................................................................... 52 
Figure 4-4 1kB extraction speeds, sorted high to low ......................................................... 55 
Figure 5-1 System Diagram for Iteration 2 ........................................................................ 58 
Figure 5-2 Using an oscilloscope to decipher the communication patterns between the ST-
Link driver and the DUT. .................................................................................................. 59 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xi 
Figure 5-3 Driver comparisons of 1kB extraction speeds, sorted high to low ..................... 60 
Figure 5-4 System Diagram of Iteration 2 Test station ...................................................... 62 
Figure 5-5 Single Switch Schematic ................................................................................... 63 
Figure 5-6 Test Station schematic with a single switch. .................................................... 64 
Figure 5-7 Picture of Test Station ..................................................................................... 64 
Figure 5-8 Modular Python modules used in Iteration 2 .................................................... 65 
Figure 5-9 Updated Radical GUI ....................................................................................... 69 
Figure 5-10 DUT aligned with the beam ............................................................................ 71 
Figure 5-11 Test station on a shielded table ...................................................................... 71 
Figure 6-1 System Diagram for Iteration 3. ....................................................................... 75 
Figure 6-2 The system with a replaced, longer ethernet cable. .......................................... 76 
Figure 6-3 Final GUI snippet ............................................................................................. 78 
Figure 6-4 A depiction of the scripting progress ................................................................. 80 
 
  




List of Tables  
 
 
Table 2-1 Comparison of STM32 and Arduino MCUs for space development applications 19 
Table 4-1 POC UART communication protocol ................................................................ 48 
Table 5-1 Communication protocol between the test station and the monitoring station .. 66 
Table 7-1 Visualization of upsets across eight bytes of SRAM cells. .................................. 83 
 
  







ADC  Analog-to-Digital Converter, 23, 24, 38, 39, 47, 48 
CAN  Controller Aided Network, 19, 21, 22, 39, 40, 47, 48 
COTS  Commercial-Off-The-Shelf, 3 - 5, 8, 12, 17, 18, 24, 29 - 32, 89 
CPU   Central Processing Unit, 28, 111 
CRC   Cyclic Redundancy Check, 20, 22, 38, 47, 70, 85 
DUT  Device-Under-Test, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 - 17, 27, 29 - 38, 40 - 44, 46 - 49, 52 - 63, 
65 - 67, 69 - 75, 78 - 80, 82 - 91, 109 – 111 
FLNR  Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions, 12 
FPU   Floating-Point Unit, 19, 32 
GUI   Graphical User Interface, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 67, 68, 71, 72, 74, 76 - 78, 81,  
88, 89 
IDE   Integrated Development Environment, 19, 37, 51, 52, 53 
I2C   Inter-Integrated Circuit, 23, 40, 47, 48 
IC   Integrated Circuit, 25, 28 
iTL   iThemba LABS, 4 - 7, 9, 13 - 16, 18, 29, 32, 44, 45, 57, 58, 69, 74, 76, 77, 79,  
81, 87, 88, 90, 92 
JINR  Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, 12, 13 
LEO   Low Earth Orbit, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11 - 13, 18, 36, 40, 41 
LET   Linear Energy Transfer, 9, 12 - 13, 30, 69, 70, 83, 86 
LFI   Laser Fault Injection, 28, 29 
M CU  Microcontroller unit, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17 - 20, 22 - 40, 42, 43, 45 - 56, 60, 61,  
65, 67, 69, 72, 82, 83, 85, 87 - 89, 91 
M OSFET  Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor-Field-Effect-Transistor, 10, 62 
PC   Personal Computer, 29, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 67, 77, 88, 109 
PCB   Printed Circuit Board, 25 
POC   Proof of Concept, 5, 6, 35, 40, 43, 45, 46, 48 - 50, 52 - 54, 56 -58, 60, 61, 67,  
74, 87, 88 
SAINTS  South African Institute of Nuclear Technology & Sciences, 13 
SANSA  South African National Space Agency, 2 
SEE   Single Event Effect, iii, 4 - 9, 11 - 20, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32 - 34, 36, 40 - 42, 
44 - 47, 53, 56, 57, 61, 62, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 79, 81 - 85, 87 – 92 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xiv 
SEFI   Single-Event Functional Interrupt, 11, 34, 40, 41, 46, 48 
SEL   Single-Event Latchup, 10, 13, 14, 30, 43, 44, 57, 62, 82, 89 
SET   Single-Event Transient, 10, 40, 69, 70, 82, 83 
SEU   Single-Event Upset, 10, 11, 14, 20, 29 - 31, 33, 34, 36 - 41, 44, 51, 53, 67, 69,  
70, 73, 75, 82 - 85, 87 - 90 
SPI   Serial Peripheral Interface, 22, 23, 40, 47, 48 
SRAM   Static Random-Access Memory, 3, 14, 17, 28, 32, 53, 61, 73, 82 – 86 
SSH    Secure Socket Host, 58, 64, 67, 68, 71, 74 - 79, 81, 88 
STM    STMicroelectronics, 18, 19, 26, 37, 53 
SWD  Serial Wire Debug, 27 
TAP   Test Access Port, 25, 26, 49, 54 
TI   Texas Instruments, 30 
TID   Total Ionising Dose, 7 - 9, 11, 14, 30, 38, 39, 62, 91 
TM R  Triple Modular Redundancy, 85, 86 
UART  Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter, 20 - 22, 29, 32, 35 - 49, 51, 52,  
57, 62, 79, 85, 86, 88, 90, 108, 109, 111 
USB   Universal Serial Bus, 9, 26, 30, 37, 44, 46, 57 - 59, 62, 63, 91 
 
 








As electronic devices shrink in both size and cost, and the drive in developing countries, like 
South Africa, to showcase their abilities to reach for the stars grow, it becomes simpler and 
more affordable for universities, national research organisations, and even private companies 
to expand into satellite and space technologies. 
This chapter introduces a brief look at the South African history in satellite development and 
the need for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf components to be used in these designs. Then a 
overview of ionising radiation testing is given, followed by the need for more effective ionising 
radiation testing in the South African context. Finally, the problem statements, research 
questions and document layout is discussed. 
1.1 The Growth of South African micro-and nanosatellites 
In 1980, South Africa started a military-driven space program, planning both a launcher and 
an earth observation satellite. Despite producing excellent space test facilities, the military 
program was halted in 1994 due to a political shift before building any flight-ready satellites. 
The development then shifted to the local universities, with Stellenbosch University 
launching Africa's first orbiting microsatellite, SUNSAT-1, in February 1999. SUNSAT-1 
operated from 1999 to 2001 when contact was lost [1]. 
In 2009 the second locally produced microsatellite, Sumbandila-Sat, developed and built by 
SunSpace, was launched. SunSpace was a Stellenbosch University spin-off company, and 
their microsatellite delivered more than 1200 images before a power switch failure caused a 
stability loss in 2011. 
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In 2009 the Cape Peninsula University of Technology also started a satellite engineering 
program and later collaborated with the South African National Space Agency (SANSA) 
Space Science Directorate and Stellenbosch University to develop ZACUBE-1, the first South 
African nanosatellite, which was launched in 2013 [2]. 
In 2010 the South African National Space Agency was established to coordinate and 
implement the national space program. Since then, the emphasis was placed on growing the 
South African presence in space development. The local government awarded SANSA a 
significant R4.47 billion in 2020 to develop a Space Infrastructure Hub as part of their 
Sustainable Infrastructure Development Symposium [3]. 
1.2 The need for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf components 
Even though there is active growth in the South African space sector, funding is still limited, 
and only some 180-200 people are currently involved in engineering space-related activities 
[4]. As a result, there is a limited number of resources to develop every needed component 
from the ground up. 
However, modern Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components are readily available. 
They can satisfy most satellite design needs, allowing designers to retain the same capabilities 
while significantly reducing cost and development times. 
Since most COTS components have a design focus on being as space-efficient and affordable 
to produce in bulk as possible, especially for cell phone and automobile use, this allows a 
significant weight reduction of satellites and faster development times. 
Using COTS components may not be a perfect solution. COTS components cannot 
necessarily handle the extreme temperature swings found in space and are usually not tested 
for radiation sensitivity. Yet, this is much less of a concern for micro-and nanosatellites as 
they typically orbit in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO), which is much less harsh than outside 
the magnetosphere shielding. 
Much of the satellite development in South Africa focuses on researching certain technology 
pieces or showcasing the countries' growth in potential. Mitigation techniques could be 
applied to harden these satellites' overall design as much as possible while still using COTS 
components, as seen on Sumbandila-Sat [1]. 
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To implement these mitigation techniques, the components used will need to be tested for 
radiation sensitivity to identify the areas that require mitigation. Unfortunately, ionising 
radiation testing is hard to implement as available testing facilities are scarce. 
1.3 Ionising radiation testing 
Testing electronics for radiation sensitivity can be challenging, especially in developing 
countries where local, capable facilities are seldom available. Further, depending on the 
technology used inside a specific Device-Under-Test (DUT), a slight configuration change 
can have a radical effect on the entire system's radiation sensitivity.  
It is almost impossible to define a global model that fits all use cases to predict radiation 
sensitivity. There is a need for each system to be thoroughly tested before sent into orbit. 
Typically, there are two main branches of ionising radiation testing. 
Firstly, an individual component analysis is when only individual components like single 
SRAM cells are tested and give a fundamental understanding of how they react in a hostile 
environment. This type of analysis typically does not predict a response if the tested 
component is used in conjunction with any other components. The more complex a system, 
the more effects will be noticeable that the foundational component analysis will not directly 
characterise. 
Secondly, overall system analysis tests the entire system as a unit instead of 
characterising the individual components in isolation. Usually, this gives a reasonable 
estimation of a system's fault rate but makes it extremely hard to detect in which area of 
the system specific errors occurred. 
A developer can create a mitigation strategy by using these two approaches in tandem by 
determining when an error in a system occurs and a thorough knowledge of the foundational 
elements' response. 
This approach does become extremely difficult when using COTS components, as 
manufacturers might not necessarily divulge how a part's manufacturing is implemented on 
a foundational level. For complex systems like microprocessors with thousands of sub-
components, it becomes virtually impossible. Even different compile methods can lead to 
vastly different radiation sensitivity results as various sections of the processor are used or 
disabled. As a result, designers seeking insight into the radiation sensitivity of systems 
constructed from COTS components typically only have the option of an overall system fault 
rate. 
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A further complication for ionising radiation testing is that different sub-atomic interactions 
can lead to radiation-induced faults. The entire space radiation spectrum's full testing would 
require several tests and would need various separate testing facilities. 
1.4 The need for more effective testing methodologies 
An ideal development plan to achieve good radiation mitigation results would be to design 
a system and perform the full spectrum of radiation sensitivity tests to identify sensitive 
areas. The developer could then apply mitigation, and the system could be retested to verify 
the effectiveness of the modifications. This process can then be repeated until a satisfactory 
level of mitigation is achieved. 
In the South African context, with limited facilities, such an approach is unpractical. Instead, 
designers tend to mitigate what they think is significant and avoid full spectrum ionising 
radiation testing process, due to the lack of both adequate facilities and testing knowledge. 
This approach leads to problems once the system is exposed to the harsher environment of 
LEO and can even be lethal to the system should the data corruption occur in a vital part 
of the system, such as a bootloader. 
There is a need for practical, accessible ionising radiation testing that, at a minimum, can 
give an estimation of a systems radiation response, including where the faults occur, 
preferably without having to go through the entire testing process repeatedly. 
1.5 Problem statements and research questions 
To date, no South African-built nanosatellite has been completely tested for durability 
against ionising radiation found in the harsh environment of LEO and outer space. However, 
most of these satellites have experienced Single Event Effect (SEE) induced failures during 
their missions [15]. 
The shortage of SEE testing can be attributed to a lack of SEE test facilities and a lack of 
viable SEE testing methodologies available to South African satellite designers. Some tests 
have been done ad hoc at iThemba LABS (iTL), in Cape Town, South Africa. Until recently, 
there were no dedicated test standards or methodologies that could be followed to get 
consistent, repeatable results. 
However, SEE testing at iTL has very recently become a viable option due to the work 
presented in [15], making SEE testing of COTS components, especially critical system 
components like microcontroller units (MCU), more accessible to local research and 
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development groups. These groups cannot afford full radiation-hardened systems and rely 
on these COTS components in their designs. 
To aid South African researchers and satellite designers to be able to perform SEE tests on 
some of the most critical core components, the MCUs, the following three main research 
questions are asked: 
1. Which COTS MCUs should the local SEE testing be focused on? 
2. How can effective, low-level microprocessor SEE testing be integrated into the iTL 
environment? 
3. How can tools like fault injection be used to help testers prepare for SEE testing and 
verify their mitigation techniques? 
The rest of this document will describe the research conducted and the solution developed 
to answer these questions. The solution required multiple iterations on developing a SEE 
data extraction and fault injection test suite to aid satellite designers in better preparing for 
MCU SEE testing and simplifying the testing interface during SEE testing to optimize the 
scarce beamtime. 
1.6 Document Layout 
The layout of this document is summarized as follows: 
• Chapter 1: This chapter presents the introduction and motivation for this research 
and the research questions. 
• Chapter 2: The literature study presents and discusses relevant literature in this 
chapter, such as the radiation effects in semiconductors and why COTS processors 
need to be tested before being used in South African satellites. An argument for which 
COTS MCUs the testing should focus on is presented, followed by a quick analysis of 
SEE testing methods of similar devices at other institutions. 
• Chapter 3: This chapter explores the concept design of a data extraction and fault 
injection test suite to aid designers in testing MCUs. The design requirements and 
drivers are stated, along with the desired functionality to reach these requirements. 
Possible implementations of the various parts of the system are then discussed.   
• Chapter 4: This chapter presents the implementation of a Proof of Concept (POC) 
design that showcases the foundation the system will be built on. Focus is placed on 
data extraction and injection methods, as that is the core component of this system, 
primarily through access provided through a technology called JTAG. 
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• Chapter 5: This chapter improves the POC to a working prototype, which gains the 
needed functionality to interface between the tester and the DUT and is then tested 
in a real SEE test at iTL to verify its effectiveness 
• Chapter 6: This chapter further improves the prototype of the previous chapter, 
making the system more useable for a variety of situations, and fixing the problems 
that arose during the testing of the prototype. 
• Chapter 7: This chapter speculates how data injection can be helpful to satellite 
designers. 
• Chapter 8: This thesis concludes with some thoughts about implementing the latest 
iteration of the system and highlights some areas of interest that can be the basis of 
future research and improvement on this project.  





2. Literature Review 
 
Before any solutions can be sought to aid the SEE testing of microcontrollers, it is critical 
to first inspect the testing environment, look at research that has already been done, and 
investigate the available technologies that are available to be used. 
This chapter takes a more in-depth look at the technologies surrounding ionising radiation 
testing, specifically with microcontroller units (MCU) in mind. The focus will be on the 
specific mechanics, types of testing, testing facilities available, South African-based facilities, 
and investigate proton beam testing approaches at iThemba LABS (iTL). Then MCUs are 
discussed along with some technologies needed to create this project, and examples of other 
research endeavours with MCU SEE testing. 
2.1 Brief introduction to the effects of ionising radiation in semiconductors 
Since the transistor's introduction in 1948, technological advances have led to incredibly 
intricate architectures, smaller dimensions, higher density integrations, lower voltage 
supplies, and much higher operating frequencies [5, 6]. These improvements have led to 
digital systems that can execute complex objectives while using less space and power than 
ever before and are more reliably and economically produced. 
For most terrestrial applications, this is highly beneficial. For extra-terrestrial use, this also 
led to reduced transistor reliability in the harsher Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and space 
environments by being more susceptible to radiation interference-induced faults caused by 
energised particles, protons, and heavy ions. These charged particles or secondary particles, 
such as alpha particles from neutron collisions inside the device [7], interact with the internal 
components and can be credited to tightened noise margins and reduced threshold voltages 
and node capacitances [8, 9]. These interactions can lead to onboard radiation damage in 
satellites if left unchecked. Onboard radiation damage can be grouped into Total Ionising 
Dose (TID) and Single-Event Effects (SEE). 
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TID is a cumulative effect of long-term device degradation when exposed to ionising 
radiation. It is not a primary focus of this research, but is discussed in the next section as, 
for South African ionising radiation testing context, testing for both TID and SEE will 
typically be scheduled together due to logistical reasons. It is briefly investigated because, 
should some elements of testing be interchangeable, it might simplify the preparation for the 
testers. 
In contrast, SEE occurs when an individual ionising particle interacts with a device and 
causes an effect [10], either through direct or indirect ionisation. Direct ionisation is where a 
charged particle directly deposits enough energy to cause an effect by freeing electron-hole 
pairs along its travel path through the semiconductor material. Indirect ionisation is where 
the fault occurs by triggering a secondary nuclear reaction in an inelastic collision with a 
target nucleus as it enters the semiconductor lattice [11]. 
2.2 Total Ionising Dose testing 
TID testing is available locally to South Africans and occurs more frequently than SEE 
testing. Due to the proximity of the TID and SEE testing facilities, tests can be scheduled 
together for logistical reasons, especially for testers that need to travel to reach these facilities 
in Cape Town. It will be a bonus if the design of this project can accommodate some aspects 
of TID testing to try to accommodate testers to only test MCUs with one system, aiding 
their preparation time. For this reason, a brief overview of TID testing, as used in South 
Africa specifically, is made. Complete integration of the system designed in this project into 
a TID testing environment is outside the scope of this project 
TID is the cumulative damage of a semiconductor lattice caused by ionising radiation over 
time. In a space radiation environment, this damage is caused by high-energy particles [21]. 
For terrestrial testing, irradiation with high-energy photons from a Co60 gamma-ray source 
can be used to simulate the harsh space environment [22]. 
TID results in constant damage to the system through trapped charge produced by the 
ionising radiation, caught in the semiconductors' dielectric material. Eventually, this damage 
can cause parametric and functional failures in microcircuits through changes such as shifts 
in the threshold voltage, gain reductions, or increased leakage currents [23]. Typical dose 
rates for LEO satellite systems developed in South Africa should be around 2kRad per year. 
Thus, for a lifespan of 5 years, satellite systems should be able to withstand a total dosage 
of more than 10kRad [24]. 
As described by [24], Stellenbosch University has been involved with TID testing of COTS 
components since 2000 and tested more than 30 devices between then and 2007. The setup 
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described could deliver between 2.42kRad/h, 1.5m from the source, to 15.1kRad/h at a 
distance of 0.6m. The possible large diameter from the source allows for irradiation of several 
DUTs simultaneously. The dose rate can be determined accurately due to movement along 
the increased radius between the DUTs and the source, compared to smaller setups, such as 
described by [25] at the University of Saskatchewan that has a chamber size of 0.152m 
(diameter) by 0.206m (height) and a dose rate of 16.2kRad/h (4.6 Rad/s). 
For the physical testing at [24], the cylindrical Co60 source can be pneumatically lifted from 
or retracted into an underground shielded housing. When raised, the entire room is exposed 
to the source, and the researcher chooses the most desirable distance from the source for the 
TID experiments. Communication with the DUTs need to be established from outside the 
testing area as the exposure is hazardous to humans. The measurements were taken by a 
university-developed data acquisition system that was placed inside the radiation chamber. 
A laptop remotely controlled it from outside the radiation chamber through either an RS232 
or USB connection. 
The parameters tested to verify the TID effects on the DUTs vary depending on the devices 
tested. Processor functionality tests were done for various peripheral and core components, 
including supply currents, I/O write-read, memory tests, and peripheral loop-backs. 
2.3 Single-Event Effect Testing Overview 
2.3.1 Important definitions 
Two essential terms need to be understood to discuss and model the effects of ionising 
radiation on specific electronic circuits. Though not used extensively in this document they 
are critical in understanding the work done in [15], which is the basis for SEE test setups at 
iTL.  
 
These terms are briefly explained as follow: 
• A cross-section is a measure of the probability that a specific process will occur 
when some radiant excitation intersects a local phenomenon [18], or simply how likely 
is it particles will interact with each other in a given way [19]. 
• Linear Energy Transfer (LET) is the average (radiation) energy deposited per 
unit path length along the track of an ionising particle [20]. 
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2.3.2 Types of SEE 
SEE can be divided into various groups. Some effects are non-destructive and only have 
temporary effects. These effects are called soft errors [13]. Likewise, some effects can be 
destructive to the system, and these are called hard errors. [13] Some of these destructive 
effects can have a temporary impact if caught and reset quickly enough, and others are 
devastating to the system should they occur [12]. 
The soft errors are Single-Event Upsets (SEU), Multiple-Bit Upsets, and Single-Event 
Transients (SET). While the hard errors are Single-Event Latchups (SEL), Single-Event 
Snapback, Single-Event Burnout, and Single-Event Gate Rupture. These effects can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Single-Event Upset is a temporary change of state in a memory or control bit [14] 
of a storage element due to the effect of a single charged particle strike. The particle 
strike incurs no damage, and the state can be corrected by overwriting the corrupted 
bit to its original value [16]. An SEU can be directly induced through deposited charge 
from the charged particle in a critical transistor of a storage element circuit, as shown 
in Figure 2.1. It can also occur due to a SET captured by a storage element [15]. 
• M ultiple-Bit Upset is a temporary change of state in multiple memory or control 
bits of a storage element due to the effects of a single charged particle strike. It 
operates on the same mechanism as SEU. 
• Single-Event Transients are voltage glitches in circuits caused by the disposition 
of charge near a transistor's charge-sensitive area. This charge is amplified by the 
transistor and incorrectly stored further along the circuit by a memory element 
[15][16]. 
• Single-Event Latchup occurs when a current path is established by forming a 
thyristor structure in a transistor during charge disposition [16]. SEL can be non-
destructive if detected and mitigated quickly enough by removing power to the 
transistor before the current leak generates enough heat to damage the element or be 
destructive otherwise. 
• Single-Event Snapback occurs at the drain junction of an N-channel power Metal-
Oxide-Semiconductor-Field-Effect-Transistor (MOSFET) and is similar to SEL [14]. 
• Single-Event Burnout occurs when the drain-source voltage exceeds the 
breakdown voltage in a power MOSFET due to the substrate close to the transistor's 
source becoming forward biased [15]. 
• Single-Event Gate Rupture happens when deposited charge near high-intensity 
electric fields lead to a current path destroying the gate or a dielectric layer of high 
power MOSFET devices [15]. 
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These effects can also lead to a Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI), which is not an 
effect in itself, but rather the result when any SEE triggers a loss in system functionality, 
leading to the system functioning incorrectly [15]. 
 
Figure 2-1 A representation of an SEU strike [17] 
 
2.3.3 SEE testing variations 
SEE testing is usually done through the use of particle accelerators. A particle accelerator 
propels and accelerates ions and charged particles such as protons to speeds close to 
lightspeed. Particle accelerators direct these particles' movement direction by using magnetic 
fields, and acceleration is possible through changes in electric fields the particle is moving 
through [26]. 
The particles can be energised due to their inertia and can be guided towards and then 
smashed into targets to investigate the collision effects. For semiconductors, as found inside 
MCUs, the effects mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2 can occur when the charged particles bombard 
the semiconductor. Particles of different sizes and energies will cause other SEE effects. 
Testers must do several tests to get a semiconductor response model equivalent to LEO 
exposure, using various types of charged particles. Without these tests, the testers have no 
way to know which components are vulnerable to SEE. As such, they will also not know on 
which subcomponents to apply SEE mitigation techniques. 
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There are several types of charged particle beams. Each type has advantages and 
disadvantages when used for SEE testing. 
2.3.3.1 Heavy Ion Beams 
Heavy-ion beams are obtained in particle accelerators by accelerating charged nuclei heavier 
than protons to increase the ion energy to ionising radiation levels. Carbon-ion beams are 
used in radiotherapy, mostly in Europe and Asia [30] for cancer therapy by accelerating 
carbon ions to 70% of the speed of light and irradiating the target cancer cells while 
minimising the dose to the adjacent critical organs [27]. 
For replicating the SEE sensitivity of electronics in an extra-terrestrial environment, testers 
can use heavy-ion beams to study the mechanisms contributing to SEEs and estimate in-
orbit error rates. SEEs induced from heavy ions typically occur due to the release of electron-
hole pairs along the path of energetic charged particles [28]. 
The direction of heavy ions can be directed using magnetic fields as they are ionised and not 
charge-neutral. Thus, heavy-ion beams with required energies can be delivered by large 
accelerators located mainly at basic physics research laboratories. The ions are navigated 
through the accelerator and fired directly at the target DUT. Accelerators are restricted by 
the maximum speed of ion acceleration. Changing the ion changes the energies that can be 
reached since the mass of the ion changes. It is essential to change the nucleon energy and, 
subsequently, the LET to enable different heavy ions' penetration levels. The variation in 
penetration depth ensures the DUT gets proper exposure. Since the energy is known for each 
type of heavy-ion, an accurate cross-section can be calculated. 
From [29] the Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions (FLNR) Joint Institue of Nuclear 
Research (JINR) cyclotron can deliver an ion energy range of 3-60 MeV/nucleon and an 
LET range of 4-5-100 MeV/(mg/cm2) for SEE testing, and can accelerate 16O2+, 22Ne3+, 
40Ar5+, 40Ar4+, 36Fe7+, 84Kr9+, 84Kr11+, 132Xe11+, 132Xe18+, 209Be23+ and 209Be19+. The facility 
has all the needed infrastructure for SEE testing but typically only switches between different 
heavy ions once per week. As a result, for an accurate cross-section derived from multiple 
tests with multiple ions, testing can be time-intensive. 
Because of their size relative to other nuclei, heavy-ion testing typically happens under 
vacuum to avoid air molecule collisions. Heavy ions also do not penetrate deeply into dense, 
high-Z materials, and as such, COTS components need to be de-lidded. De-lidding can 
damage the underlying circuitry, and it can be a complicated process to achieve reliable 
results, possibly affecting SEE testing results. FLNR does have de-lidding facilities. 
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A research relationship already exists between iTL and the JINR. Several research and 
growth programs, such as the South African Institute of Nuclear Technology & Sciences 
(SAINTS), are being organised annually [37]. 
2.3.3.2 Proton Beams 
Conceptually, protons can be thought of as ionised Hydrogen, as stripping Hydrogen of its 
electron leaves only a proton. This makes it easy to think of proton beams as heavy-ion 
beams, but with Hydrogen ions instead of heavy ions. These beams are the primary focus of 
many high-energy cyclotrons [31], and different accelerators can produce proton beams with 
a wide range of nucleon energies. 
Like heavy-ions, proton radiotherapy is used in the treatment of cancers and tumours. While 
worse at breaking down the tumours, it does do less damage to surrounding healthy tissue.  
Proton beams are preferred in countries like the United States of America, partly due to 
different funding procedures and the more complex physical and biological features of heavy 
ions [32], making it more complex to implement. 
For SEE testing while using proton beams, beam energies higher than 180MeV are 
recommended to trigger SEL [33]. Further, the LET of protons is typically too small to 
trigger SEE by direct ionisation. Instead, the protons cause secondary nuclear reactions that 
cause SEE, making it impossible to know the secondary particles' LET. It could be much 
higher than that of the incident particle. [33]. As a result, it is hard to determine an absolute 
cross-section, but it is possible to determine cross-sections per proton energies, which can 
help determine the areas of a system that are sensitive to SEEs and needs extra mitigation. 
2.3.3.3 Neutron Beams 
Neutrons are the predominant SEE cause between the operating altitudes for commercial 
aircraft and sea level [34]. Neutrons are charge-neutral and cannot be guided and accelerated 
in the same way as proton beams or heavy-ion beams. The JESD89 standard recommends 
two types of neutron beams for SEE testing. Both are generated by bombarding specific 
targets to get a particular neutron emission response, effectively converting the proton beam 
into a neutron beam [34]. 
Spallation neutron sources emit neutrons that cover a large energy spectrum. This 
spectrum resembles the natural high-altitude neutron spectrum [34]. These sources are 
created by proton-bombardment of materials like tungsten, lead, and liquid mercury [15]. 
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M onoenergetic neutron sources emit monoenergetic neutrons and can be generated by 
proton-bombardment of materials like scandium, lithium fluoride, deuterium, and tritium-
loaded titanium [15]. 
2.4 SEE Testing, in a South African context 
This section handles SEE testing in South Africa and heavily relies on the work done in [15] 
as that made reliable SEE testing available to local academics. Almost all information in 
this section can be found in [15] but is briefly summarised for convenience. 
2.4.1 General Testing Standards 
Several standards give guidance on testing for ionising radiation-induced effects on 
electronics. According to [35], there are several critical standards for radiation testing and 
several other standards that can be used in conjunction with the key standards. Because 
devices keep changing and testing needs to be continually adapted to adjust to the modern 
instruments, the standards give a guideline of acceptable testing practices rather than a 
dedicated protocol. It is up to the tester to align their testing method to these standards, 
but ESA-ESCC-25100: SEE Test method and Guidelines [35] is a good place to start. The 
full recommended list is available at [36] at the time of this writing and encompasses 
guidelines for heavy-ion, proton, and neutron SEE testing, as well as TID testing. 
Testing at iTL for this project was done following the testing standards identified and 
implemented in Chapter 2.6 of [15]. It lists the standards selected when testing specifically 
at iTL. 
2.4.2 Testing in a South African context 
South African satellites have been heavily impacted by a lack of proper SEE sensitivity 
testing. SUNSAT, operational 1999-2001, needed a rewrite of onboard firmware due to 
SRAM SEUs. SRAM micro SELs forced firmware and operational improvements to keep 
Sumbandila-Sat working. In-orbit observations of SaudiSat 3, built by SunSpace, also 
revealed SRAM sensitivities to SEE [15]. 
To date, no South African-built complete satellite system has undergone SEE testing before 
launch. The need for SEE testing is increasing, especially with industry demand quickly 
growing. Some SEE tests have been done on the CubeComputer to verify detected in-orbit 
anomalies. These tests were only done after the component was in-orbit, and with proper 
testing before launch the severity and characteristics of anomalies could have been 
characterised and possibly mitigated. The CubeComputer is built around an 
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EFM32GG280F1024 MCU from Silicon Labs, based on the 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 
architecture [71]. 
Until recently, testing for SEEs locally in South Africa, or even on the African continent, 
was highly unrealistic. The only facility with a sufficient particle accelerator is iTL, which is 
mostly used for medical purposes and research. However, electronics testing at iTL has only 
been done on an ad hoc basis [15], and minimal experience and guidelines for electronics 
testing is available, as it is mostly used for medical purposes and research. 
To try and prevent future errors as those found in SUNSAT, Sumbandila-Sat and SaudiSat 
3 emphasis will need to be placed on consistent, reliable SEE testing. Ionising radiation 
testing allows satellite designers to observe MCU vulnerability to SEE before the parts reach 
LEO, making it easier to fortify vulnerable areas, decide whether the chosen MCUs are 
fitting for the mission before including them in the design, and to implement and test 
mitigation strategies to deter data corruption and improve the chance of data correction 
should SEE occur. The outcome of all these options is that the final implementation of the 
MCU should be more radiation-tolerant than without ionising radiation testing, and the 
MCU implementation used in the final design can be expected to have a longer functional 
life expectancy. 
2.4.3 Test setup and procedure at iThemba LABS  
Testing at iTL will be done according to [15], under the original author's guidance, and is 
specific to SEE testing at iTL. It is summarised in this section. 
Test slots for SEE at iTL usually have a minimum of 8 hours of beamtime. Personnel needed 
to conduct tests include the researchers working the tests and all the iTL staff required to 
operate the facility. Factoring in the power cost to use the beam itself, it can cost R90k/hour, 
so effective testing is crucial. 
The proton beam will be guided through the accelerator system to the test vault under 
vacuum, where it will exit into the air through a Havar window. Upon exiting the Havar 
window, the beam spread will be around 3mm to 6mm, which is too narrow to irradiate most 
MCUs. From this point, the beam shape can be modified by the testers to produce the 
required setup, as described in the following paragraphs. 
Before the test, the following setup is implemented: 
A thin lead sheet is placed directly after the Havar window to scatter the beam. The thicker 
the lead sheet, the wider the angle of scatter. Typically the beam spread needs to be wide 
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enough that the DUT receives a uniform exposure. A set of collimators is then used to absorb 
the excess scatter to ensure that only the DUT is exposed in the beam spot. Should the beam 
energy being delivered be too high for the test requirements, it can be degraded by placing 
Plexiglass inline between the beam and the DUT. The thicker the Plexiglass, the more 
significant the energy degradation of the protons. 
The distances between the Havar window, the lead sheet, the collimators and DUTs are 
calculated depending on the distance between the Havar window and DUTs, the size of the 
available collimators, and the required spot size. Care should be taken to ensure all 
components are level and aligned correctly. 
The DUTs are mounted onto a controllable, movable backboard, and remotely moved in or 
out of the beam spot. A wooden table is placed near the DUTs, on which support electronics 
needed to control the communication and power the DUTs are placed. Concrete or lead  
bricks are packed between these electronics and the beam to give shielding against the 
scattered protons and secondary radiation. 
One of the support electronic devices is an ethernet switch that connects all communication 
devices inside the vault to the outside via the ethernet cable. The DUT itself is connected 
to the support and monitoring electronics, which communicates with the testers in a control 
room. The setup inside the vault is depicted in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2 Vault setup for SEE testing at iTL 
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When testing, the following procedure is followed: 
The control room gives testers access to raise and lower a Faraday cup inside the beamline, 
which blocks or allows the beam to exit into the vault. While the beam is being delivered to 
the vault's inside, all humans must be a safe distance away. No quick changes can be made 
to the test setup before the radiation levels have lowered significantly, so it is essential that 
the setup is done correctly and the remote connections are functional. 
Before any DUTs are irradiated, the beam control room is signalled to deliver a starting 
current. The higher the current, the more particles will be directed to the DUT. During the 
test, the control room can be signalled for any current changes between irradiations. 
Once the testers are ready, the Faraday cup is lowered, and a sweep is done using a Beam 
Loss Monitor to determine the beam profile to verify the spreader and collimators setup is 
correct. After that, the Faraday cup is raised, and the first DUT is moved into the beam 
spot. Irradiation of the DUTs is done in runs. A run starts with the testers agreeing on an 
exposure time and then simultaneously lowering the Faraday cup and beginning the specific 
DUT test. After the agreed time is reached, the Faraday cup is raised again, and the next 
run can begin. 
After all runs are done and the test slot is completed, the vault is left to dissipate the internal 
absorbed radiation levels. Once the levels are safe for short human exposure, any necessities 
inside the vault can quickly be collected. After a few weeks, the radiation levels will be much 
less severe and safe for longer human exposures, and the setup can be packed away. 
2.5 M icrocontroller Technologies 
Many satellites use a dedicated radiation-hardened MCU as the central controller. They are 
much more expensive than their COTS equivalents, and often are bigger and use more power. 
However, COTS MCUs are gaining popularity as secondary controllers due to the cheaper 
cost and better space and power usage. Being able to replace all secondary onboard MCUs 
with COTS MCUs that can perform non-critical tasks is vital for a more affordable satellite. 
As such, this project will focus specifically on COTS MCUs for SEE tests. 
Before a test suite can be implemented to test MCU sensitivity to SEEs, it is important to 
look at what type of MCU is viable for satellite designers to use, what components exist 
within these MCUs and how they can be tested. 
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2.5.1 M icrocontroller Selection  
As mentioned in Chapter 2.4.2, Sunsat, Sumbandila-Sat and SaudiSat 3 all experienced SEE. 
The relevant errors occurred in internal components, especially SRAM, on the satellite 
designs' respective MCUs [15]. For this project, the focus will be exclusively on COTS MCUs 
to aid local designers in properly testing future satellite endeavours. The MCU must be a 
COTS component as they are currently widely used in the local industry, from the satellites 
already launched to current component designs from the local companies [71]. Radiation-
hardened MCUs are extremely expensive, bigger and require more energy, while COTS 
MCUs are easy to implement and much more affordable. 
2.5.1.1 COTS Microcontroller requirements 
Alongside being a COTS component, the following requirements are identified for MCUs 
targeted for space use: 
• MCUs used for satellite micro-and nanosatellites must be small due to space 
restrictions and highly power-efficient due to power supply restrictions.  
• The MCU must also communicate with the rest of the system. It might not be the 
central onboard controller and only controls individual subsystems and any other 
peripherals needed to execute its tasks. 
• It must operate in an environment readily available to both the academic and 
industrial communities as SEE testing in South Africa can only be done at iTL, which 
restricts beamtime for testing to academic research. Industrial developers can then 
use public academic results to develop their systems. 
• It should be affordable and use free or inexpensive programming interfaces to 
encourage adoption in the industry and suit academic budgets. 
• It must be readily available to avoid long lead times and allow rapid development 
and adjustments, especially for test preparation. 
• It must have a built-in interface that can be used to access the boundary registers. 
• An active development community will be preferred to aid in quick design and fault-
finding. 
• It should be interfaced in a way adaptable to other MCUs. Due to the nature of low-
level fault finding and injection, some alterations will need to be made by the user for 
the specific MCU chosen. Ideally, the least number of changes should be required to 
switch MCUs. As such, the MCU-approach implemented in this project should be 
easily expandible to similar models of the same brand or even across brands. 
• It should preferably also be used or investigated by the industry for LEO satellite use. 
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2.5.1.2 Selected Microcontroller 
Two popular processor families that fit most of the previous section's requirements were 
identified, namely Arduino and STMicroelectronics (STM) STM32 processors. After an 
inspection of available MCUs in each range, the two MCU families are compared in Table 
2-1. 
Table 2-1 Comparison of STM32 and Arduino MCUs for space development applications 
Criteria W inning M CU family 
Affordability Both 
Availability Both 
Easily expanded to similar MCUs Both 
Versatile peripherals, especially CAN STM32 
Low-powered STM32 
Ease of use Arduino 
Well-developed IDE STM32 
Supporting Community Arduino 
Industry use STM32 
 
As shown in Table 2-1, Arduino is initially easier to implement. However, due to this initial 
simplicity, it quickly becomes much more complex should the designer want access to low-
level functionality. The platform was designed to be easy to use to help beginner hobbyists 
to use the technology, and as a result hides advanced features and avoids low-level access. 
Low-level access is regularly required for mitigation techniques or complex communication 
implementations. 
Currently, the Arduino community is also bigger, again due to their focus of getting 
beginners started, but the STM community is quickly growing and is advanced enough to 
provide plenty of development activity and support should it be needed. 
The STM32 MCUs are, for this use case, the better processors to use. They are ARM-based 
and are similar to ARM-based processors from other brands, thus easily expandible. They 
have an extensive range of low-powered processors. They are relatively easy to use while still 
offering programming flexibility and have free established development environments and a 
growing support community. 
Most importantly, a local company has expressed a desire to use the STM32 range in their 
satellite designs and are interested in the SEE sensitivity of these devices. They are 
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specifically interested in the STM32L452RE, an ultra-low-power MCU with a FPU Arm 
Cortex-M4 MCU. 
For this project, the STM 32L452RE will be used as the chosen test M CU , but 
care will be taken in the design to allow switching MCUs with relative ease, to avoid limiting 
the design choices of satellite designers. Switching between various STM32 MCUs should be 
fluent, and preferably other Arm-based MCUs from other manufacturers as well, as they 
share very similar designs. 
2.5.2 Peripherals 
This section will investigate MCU peripherals commonly used in satellites so that simple, 
suitable methods to verify their functionality can be discussed in Chapter 3.  
This project aims to extract data from any memory location in the MCU, including 
peripherals, to inspect for SEU. However, in most situations, it is not feasible to extract 
every bit every time an inspection is made as it can take too long to read the entire memory 
in one go. Thus, it would help to detect which areas are not functional and then only extract 
those areas to pinpoint where the fault occurred. 
These peripherals are not MCU dependent and should apply to all MCUs in most cases. 
However, specific MCUs might come with an enhanced feature set that allows more specific 
or effective testing of certain peripherals. An example of this is the built-in Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) implementation on the STM32L452RE, which can be used to 
verify memory contents. 
It is the satellite designer's responsibility to choose the best method of implementation for 
their desired goal. This section does not focus on the specific code used to get their selected 
MCU operational but rather to inspect how these peripherals operate and give insight into 
how they could be tested. 
For the specific testing approach of peripherals in this project, see Chapter 3.2. The testing 
method will be focused on exercising the peripheral while the MCU analyses its functionality. 
This should be handy should the functionality of specific peripherals need to be verified if it 
performs a critical role. 
2.5.2.1 UART 
A universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART) is an asynchronous communication 
device. It has configurable data formats and transmission speeds. It consists of one transmit 
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and one receive line and is commonly used for communication over computer or peripheral 
serial ports [38]. Most MCU's contain a minimum of one UART due to its use as a simple 
debugging interface. 
For communication between two UARTs, typically from two different subsystems, the 
receiver of one is connected to the other's transmitter and vice versa. The transmitter and 
receiver on both devices both contain a shift register used to convert between serial and 
parallel forms. The transmitter's data is delivered in parallel from the transmitting device 
into the shift register and then sent bit by bit, sequentially, to the other device's receiver.  
Received data is stored in a shift register and restored to a byte, and available to the 
processor. 
If no data is being transmitted, the line is usually held high. When a message starts, the line 
is pulled low as a start signal followed by the byte, a parity bit, if enabled, and finally, the 
stop bits. This process repeats for every byte until the entire message is broadcasted. This 
can be shown in a timing diagram, as in Figure 2-3. 
This method of communication is typically slow, given its serial nature and use of slower 
transmission speed. It can also usually only be used for communication between two devices, 
and not more. It also has no built-in method for verifying that the entire message, whether 
transmitted or received, was correctly received. 
 
Figure 2-3 UART communication timing diagram example 
 
2.5.2.2 Controller Aided Network 
Controller Aided Network (CAN) was initially introduced to reduce wiring in automobiles 
by being a multi-master, message broadcast system [39]. Unlike UART, CAN does not send 
messages from only one device to another. It broadcasts short bursts of data, like temperature 
or RPM, to every device connected to the network, allowing all devices to access the data 
and process it as is required. 
A CAN network topology requires at least two nodes to communicate, and all nodes are 
connected with a two-wire bus. It can be extremely robust and requires both wires to act in 
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unison, sending data with one wire pulled to 0V and the other high to indicate a low in the 
message. This is demonstrated in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4 CAN Communication timing diagram example [40] 
Each node in the network requires a digital signal processor or MCU, a CAN controller, and 
a CAN transceiver connected to the CAN Bus-Line. CAN messages consist of multiple parts, 
as shown in Figure 2-5. These parts include 0-8 data bytes, a 16-bit CRC containing the 
checksum of the message data for error detection, and an acknowledge bit (ACK) that can 
be used notifying the sender the receiver has detected an error. For a description of the other 
overhead, see the ISO-11898:2003 Standard. 
 
Figure 2-5 Typical CAN message structure [39] 
Because of CAN's robustness and the ability of every connected node to individually continue 
its execution while all are simultaneously receiving system data, it is a proper communication 
protocol to implement on electronic satellite systems.[41] 
 2.5.2.3 Serial Peripheral Interface 
A Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) is a synchronous single-master-multi-slave network often 
used to send data between MCUs and multiple other peripherals, such as SD cards and 
sensors [42]. It has a similar communication method to that of a UART, except that all 
devices operate on the same synced clock frequency. The master device can select a slave 
device to which it can transmit and receive data. This is visualised in Figure 2-6. 
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Figure 2-6 SPI connection layout [43] 
 
2.5.2.4 Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) 
I2C is another communication protocol that allows connections to multiple slave devices 
from a single master device and numerous master devices to one or more slave devices [44]. 
This is handy when multiple devices need access to a single peripheral, such as various 
MCUs, all logging data to the same SD card. Messages consist of different parts, called 
frames. The address frame allows slave devices to know to which device the message is 
directed. Figure 2-7 shows a message breakdown. 
 
Figure 2-7 Typical I2C message structure [45] 
 
2.5.2.5 Analog-to-Digital Converter 
An Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) is a peripheral device that converts analogue signals 
into digital signals for MCUs to process. The digital signal would then represent a discrete 
version of a measured voltage or current, like battery voltages [46]. 
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As shown in Figure 2-8, the peripheral converts continuous-time, continuous-amplitude 
signals to discretised signals. This process introduces a small error, whose magnitude is 
dependent on the ADC resolution. 
 
Figure 2-8 Representation of ADC discretization [47] 
 
2.5.3 Expandability to other M CUs 
The selected processor for this project, the STM32L452RE, is an Arm Cortex-M4 processor 
with the Armv7E-M architecture. Arm does not manufacture its own processors but instead 
licenses the processor architecture to third parties who implement, modify, manufacture and 
sell the processors. 
As a result, the ARM architecture is the foundation for many COTS MCUs, including the 
embedded MCU in the CubeComputer. The Arm Cortex-M series was specifically optimised 
to be low-cost and energy-efficient. According to [48], the Arm Cortex-M processors have 
been embedded in billions of consumer devices, either as dedicated MCUs or "hidden" inside 
System-on-a-Chip (SoC) chips as I/O, system, sensor, touch screen, smart battery, and 
power management controllers. Further, the Arm Cortex-M4 is the most widely deployed 
Cortex-M processor [48]. 
The Arm infrastructure also includes boundary-scan cells, described in the next section. 
However, sellers may deliberately disable physical access to prevent consumers or 
competitive manufactures from gaining access to proprietary firmware or reflashing 
embedded chips [49]. 
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As long as access can be gained to the boundary-scan cells and a memory map is provided 
to map those cells to physical peripherals or memory, JTAG, discussed in the next section, 
can be used to extract or inject data into the MCU. These MCUs should all be compatible 
with this project by making small adjustments to the interface driver controlling the JTAG 
programmer to reflect the new memory map. 
2.5.4 JTAG 
In 1985, when PCB designs became too complex and too small to verify the working of 
connections between components on the PCB via probes, both to test manufacturing quality 
and to ensure all components are properly soldered and connected, the Joint Test Access 
Group implemented what would, within five years, become an industry standard for verifying 
designs and testing PCBs [50]. This technology was named JTAG, after the group. 
Targeted initially towards board-level testing, JTAG specified the use of a dedicated debug 
port implementing low-overhead access through a serial communications interface that did 
not need direct external access to a system's address and data busses. This interface connects 
to a Test Access Port (TAP) on the chip that can access test registers, called boundary-scan 
cells, presenting chip logic levels and device capabilities of various parts [51], allowing 
manufacturers to verify the integrity of the manufactured ICs. 
These days JTAG is an essential mechanism for embedded system debugging. The system 
might not have any other debug communication channels, as it is used as the primary means 
of accessing sub-blocks of integrated circuits. Silicon architectures such as PowerPC, Arm, 
MIPS, and x86 have embraced JTAG, building entire software debug and instruction and 
data tracing infrastructures on top of the basic JTAG protocol [51]. 
Critical to this document is what is known as JTAG boundary scan testing, which provides 
access to many logic signals of complex ICs, including device pins. These signals are 
represented in a boundary scan register, accessible through the TAP. In Arm's case, this 
maps all of the boundary-scan cells in this register to the processor's memory map [52]. 
Boundary-scan cells can operate in a functional mode where they do not affect the device or 
a test mode where they disconnect the pins and the device's functional core. This allows 
users to control the values being driven from enabled devices onto a net and monitor that 
net's values [50]. 
In the Arm MCUs, such as the test device for this project, these boundary scan registers are 
equivalent to the device memory map. By examining this map, it is possible to determine 
the state of almost all digital device pins in the entire MCU. This includes the states from 
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individual bit-level latches in memory cells to the logic levels in built-in peripherals to specific 
peripherals that can be connected externally to the MCU [52]. 
A JTAG programmer is needed to use these features. Luckily, the development boards sold 
by STM already come with such a debugger in place, which implements their adaptation of 
JTAG called ST-Link. This allows users to connect to the debugger via USB. The debugger 
connects via the TAP to debug and program the board. The ST-Link can also be removed 
and replaced by a generic JTAG programmer should the need be there. Figure 2-9 shows 
the ST-Link programmer on the selected MCU. 
 
Figure 2-9 Included ST-Link JTAG programmer on MCU development board 
2.6 Fault Injection 
Fault injection is a technique that can be used as a software testing method where errors are 
deliberately introduced into the system to characterize fault propagations, test error handling 
code paths that might otherwise rarely be followed or to ensure the system can withstand or 
recover from error conditions [81, 82]. 
SEE testing is a good example of fault injection testing. By using the particle accelerator, 
testers create an environment where faults are injected at an accelerated rate into the 
component being tested to determine the component response should these errors occur 
naturally in-orbit. However, SEE testing is not the only way to inject errors, though it is 
preferable as it uses the same mechanics to trigger the faults as in-orbit. 
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If an easier way to induce a similar level of faults can be used in conjunction with SEE 
testing, it would be possible for testers to prepare for SEE tests by optimising their DUT 
implementations before SEE testing. Sensitive areas in the DUT can be discovered and 
mitigated, and mitigation techniques can also be verified. SEE testing can then only be used 
as a final verification that there are no radiation-specific induced faults, as found in-orbit, 
that somehow gets missed by the implemented mitigation techniques. 
This section investigates some different fault injection techniques and compares their 
useability for South African testing in conjunction with SEE testing to optimise the time 
spent in-beam.    
2.6.1 Fault Injection Techniques 
Faults can be injected into MCUs in various ways. For this project's purposes, only injection 
methods that function separate from the MCU core will be considered, as the goal is to inject 
into the core itself. From the MCU’s perspective, it should be unaware that any data has 
suddenly been corrupted. 
2.6.1.1 Electromagnetic Fault Injection 
Electromagnetic fault injection uses electromagnetic interference to induce faults in 
electronics. This technique was used in [73] by precisely positioning a 1mm magnetic antenna 
close to the MCU section to be injected. This antenna then gets energised with pulses with 
an amplitude range from -200V to 200V and a width that extends from 10ns to 200ns. Their 
target was an Arm-based Cortex-M3 processor, and testing followed these basic steps as 
described in their paper: “ 
• Reset the microcontroller 
• Execute the target code 
• Send a pulse to the injection antenna 
• Interrupt the program execution 
• Harvest the microcontroller’s internal data “ 
Data was extracted using Serial Wire Debug (SWD), a debug port for severely pin-limited 
packages that replaces the normal 5-pin JTAG port with a clock and single bi-directional 
data pin [74]. This data can then be evaluated to determine if errors were induced and what 
their effects are. 
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2.6.1.2 Laser Fault Injection 
Laser Fault Injection (LFI) has been proven to be a powerful technique used in fault injection 
attacks to disrupt internal processes in ICs [75]. LFI uses pulsed lasers to inject faults into 
running secure devices, usually to retrieve secret information [76]. 
Experimentation done in [77] used a solid-state Nd:YAG laser source emitting a 1064nm 
wavelength with a fixed pulse width of 800ps to inject faults into de-lidded Arm MCUs. The 
MCUs were de-lidded by mechanical means. The SRAM and CPU registers are initialized 
with an alternating bit pattern. The laser is then used to send precise pulses into the die, 
following a grid pattern. After injection, the SRAM and CPU registers' data is read out and 
compared to the known grid pattern to determine error effects. The tested MCUs were 
• STM32F051R8T6, an STM32 Arm Cortex-M0 based processor 
• STM32F401RBT6, an STM32 Arm Cortex-M4 based processor 
• NXP LPC11E14, an NXP Arm Cortex-M0 based processor 
• XMC1401-F064F0128, an Infineon Arm Cortex-M0 based processor 
2.6.1.3 JTAG Fault Injection 
From Chapter 2.5.4, JTAG can physically remove MCU core control from registers or pins, 
change the state of these pins or registers, and restore control to the MCU. It can also 
completely halt or resume MCU core operations. Thus, by stopping an MCU core, changing 
the state of relevant bits, and then continuing the core faults can be injected. Due to the 
halting of the core, the MCU is unaware of any state changes. 
JTAG-based fault injection of core devices is a non-destructive fault injection method that 
is easy to control [78] and, from the MCU’s perspective, can happen in real-time. The 
approach implemented in [79] used the JTAG interface to inject faults into the instruction 
register of a MCU and then monitor the error's propagation. This process was executed in 
the following steps: 
• Initialise the system. 
• Inject the “sample” (incorrect) instruction into the instruction register. 
• Sample the I/O data to a capture region of boundary-scan cells to extract. 
• Inject a valid instruction in the instruction register. 
• Release the device to continue in normal operation from the valid instruction point. 
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2.6.2 Sensible Fault Injection for the South African Context  
Fault injection can be a practical tool to help local designers perform necessary upset 
sensitivity and mitigation techniques before testing at iTL. This would be extremely 
beneficial as scheduling tests at iTL is time-consuming, and testing slots are scarce. However, 
this is only valid if the fault injection method is more locally available and affordable than 
SEE testing. Further, if the injection method can be easy to set up, it is more likely to be 
adopted by the industry, and it can be bundled together with the rest of this project in one 
package. 
Electromagnetic Fault Injection and LFI can inject faults while the DUT system is running. 
Still, both require complex setups that involve extremely accurate positioning systems to 
direct the injections into the correct region of the MCU [73, 77]. Further, as the area where 
faults are being induced is determined through the physical positioning of the injection source 
relative to the MCU, in-depth knowledge is needed of the physical layout of the MCU. For 
most COTS MCUs, this information is not available to the public. Also, both injection 
methods inject into MCU areas rather than just specific cells. This makes it hard to pinpoint 
components like core registers due to their small size relative to the injection source, even if 
their exact position is known. Both Electromagnetic Fault Injection and LFI require big 
setups, with LFI being one of the most expensive techniques to set up and use to inject faults 
with [80]. 
JTAG injection can only inject faults in pseudo-real-time by controlling the execution flow 
of the MCU. However, it is incredibly affordable and already integrated into almost all Arm 
processors. As seen in Chapter 2.5.4, the selected MCU for this project is available on a 
development board that already comes with a JTAG debugger attached and can allow for 
simultaneous communication between a PC and the MCU through both JTAG and UART. 
JTAG injection also gives precise control over which individual registers, and even specific 
bits, can be corrupted and can be used to monitor the effects of the injected errors. This can 
not be done through either Electromagnetic Fault Injection of LFI, and a secondary process, 
often JTAG as seen in the next section, is used to extract the data. 
It would be the most sensible for testing in South Africa to combine SEE testing with JTAG 
fault injection and data extraction.  
2.7 M CU SEE Testing 
The problem of flipped bits and corrupted data is not limited to the space environment. As 
processor designs become more complex, they become more vulnerable to environmental 
disturbances, SEE, latent defects from the manufacturing process, and verification 
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inefficiencies that allow design bugs to propagate into the system. Similarly, SEE does not 
only occur in space. Cisco has had several cases where SEUs are claimed to cause 
transmission errors in their network routers and even has a guide on how to implement a 
workaround for their 12000 line cards [53]. 
This section will investigate relevant previous MCU SEE testing methods to identify the 
required test suite interfaces. 
2.7.1 Previous SEE M CU testing 
COTS MCUs are gaining popularity for use in satellite designs. They might not be used as 
the central onboard controller but are used to control secondary processes. As such, several 
researchers have started investigating SEE effects in COTS MCUs. 
Proton irradiation was done in [54]-[56] for SEU characterization of the Pentium (R) MMX, 
Pentium (R) II and Celeron microprocessors between 2000 and 2009. In 2001, [57] 
investigated SEU in the PowerPC750 MCU. [57] also made use of JTAG to be able to 
perform testing on the DUT cache. In 2009 the clock and reset transients of a 90nm RHBD 
single-core Tilera processor was tested [58]. 
In 2014, [59] investigated SEU in low-cost, low-power COTS MCUs, including the 16-bit 
MCU Texas Instruments (TI) MSP430, the dual redundant Arm Cortex-R4 TI Hercules, the 
Arm Cortex-M4F TI Stellaris, the Arm Cortex-M4 TI Tiva and the Arm Cortex-A9 MPCore 
Xilinx Zynq. The authors also indicated a particular interest in Arm MCUs as they provide 
low-power, low-cost alternatives for general computing. 
For SEE testing in [60], a compendium of TID, neutron, proton, and heavy-ion SEE tests 
on various satellite electronics, including the Arm-based NXP LPC2148 and STM32 
F417IGH6 processors, were done. The STM32 MCU is similar to the MCU chosen as the 
test subject for this project. The processor showed SEUs and two SELs during neutron 
testing, SEUs during proton testing and non-destructive SEL with all heavy ions tested with 
a LET > 2.19 MeV-cm2/mg. 
For the SEE testing in [61], JTAG was used to verify the reliability of software algorithms 
and software-based mitigation techniques in DSPs, where JTAG could be used to access the 
memory of the entire DUT. The authors claim that, for their tests, JTAG was the easiest 
way to access register and cache space, opposed to previously used assembly codes in [62], a 
guideline for ground radiation testing for space radiation. Their results did show, however, 
that USB connection speed of the JTAG programmer influenced their results. 
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The research done in [59] – [61] was all part of research at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
connected with other research groups. They show a clear focus towards testing COTS MCUs, 
with a particular interest in Arm-based processors. The work done in [57] and [61] also 
indicates that JTAG manipulation of the boundary scan register can be used as a viable 
method to interface with DUTs during testing.  
2.7.2 M CU Testing Approaches 
In [56], the processor would execute a program and compare the registers with known values 
every computational iteration. If the values do not match, it reports that an upset was found. 
Several specific tests were performed: 
• An Arithmetic Logic Unit Test performed numerical factorization involving 
integer multiplication, division, and addition. Every step of the factorization includes 
comparing the general-purpose register values to known correct values, and SEUs are 
reported if the compared values do not correlate. 
• A Floating-Point Unit Test calculated an approximation of the value of π through 
addition, multiplication, division, and subtraction. Again, at each step, the floating-
point register stack results are compared to known correct values. 
• A Register Test loads some of the registers with 0x55 and loops, checking that the 
registers contain the correct values. 
• A Cache Test that is similar to the Register Test, except applied to the L1 cache. 
In [57], the DUT also mostly performed self-analysis and used the JTAG interface to 
investigate the contents of the L1 data and instruction caches that were otherwise 
inaccessible. The following tests were performed: 
• The “do little” Test had the DUT perform a single-instruction infinite loop that 
gets briefly interrupted every half-second to save a register snapshot to the physical 
memory. After irradiation, the snapshots are downloaded and analysed for 
irregularities. 
• The “pin wiggler” Test had the DUT perform a self-inspection of one of its internal 
memory arrays or register files. If an error is found, an address pin is toggled. External 
counters monitored this pin to give live feedback on radiation irregularities. 
• The Cache Test initialized the L1 data and instruction caches in specified conditions 
and then disabled them before the irradiation started. A clearly recognized pattern, 
distinctly different from that of the cache, was placed in the memory space covered 
by the cache. These areas were then irradiated and afterwards extracted through 
JTAG and compared with the original patterns. 
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• Additional test programs for the FPU to determine transient logic errors. No further 
specifics were given about their implementation. 
The Los Alamos National Laboratory also has several MCU benchmarks [63] that form part 
of their MCU tests. The DUTs run the benchmarks and give YAML parsable text output 
via UART to be monitored externally. This output contains information about the errors 
detected during the execution of the benchmark. At the time of this writing, four algorithms 
are publicly available: 
• Advanced Encryption Standard: This code executes a 128-AES code from Texas 
Instruments using the National Institute of Standards and Technology standards. 
• Cache Test: A program for instrumenting SRAM memory blocks or caches by 
testing the Foura mostly zeros memory pattern and implements a sum of memory 
array elements to check for transients in logic. 
• M atrix M ultiply: A program for calculating matrix multiplies and takes 
approximately the same memory as the cache test. 
• Quicksort: A program for testing quicksort. Data is randomly generated and placed 
into an array, and the inputs change every few seconds in a repeatable pattern. 
In [59], these benchmarks were used in tests in combination with watchdogs and hard resets, 
along with other benchmarks not yet released to the public. The authors of [64] also describe 
such an approach and mentions exploiting special purpose hardware modules called watchdog 
processors to gain access to and monitor the memory. However, they also note watchdogs 
do not detect latent faults in the MCU or faults in the register bank. This shows that it is 
possible to use built-in hardware to expand monitoring for SEE, should it be available. 
It is also possible to use hardware-based detection and mitigation techniques, but they 
usually change the original architecture by adding logic redundancy, error-correcting codes, 
and majority voters[64]. This does somewhat defeat the purpose of using COTS components 
in the first place. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter introduced various concepts, mechanics, technologies and research methods 
relating to SEE testing of COTS MCUs. The effects of ionising radiation were investigated, 
along with a testing approach for SEE tests specific to iTL in South Africa. The 
STM32L452RE MCU was selected as the test subject for this project, and various MCU 
technologies and testing approached were introduced. In the next chapter these concepts 
will be combined and reworked into a concept design for a SEE MCU test suite.  





3. Concept Design 
 
 
As described in Chapter 2, ionising radiation testing can be extremely beneficial in prolonging 
the life expectancy of MCUs used in satellite systems. For this project, identifying the specific 
type of SEE will not be the main focus. Nor is the focus on getting an SEU cross-section for 
one particular processor or testing a specific mitigation techniques' efficiency. The focus will 
be on designing a test suit that allows testers to better prepare for SEE tests, verify their 
particular applied mitigation techniques before testing, help them determine cross-sections 
and SEU sensitivity for a range of MCUs, and boost their efficiency while performing SEE 
tests. 
This chapter presents the theoretical implementation of a MCU SEE test suite, focussing on 
the design drivers and needs, various methods to communicate with the DUT, typical 
peripheral tests that can be used to verify the test suite functionality, and finally the iterative 
approach that was used to implement these designs. 
3.1 SEE Test Suite Design Drivers 
To achieve the goals mentioned above, a test suite is developed and the following 
requirements and limitations drive the design thereof: 
• The test suite must be used for easy integration into the SEE testing environment, 
focusing on iTL. 
• The test suite must be compatible with as wide a range of MCUs as practical, to not 
restrict the designer's options. 
• The test suite must help designers prepare for SEE testing, to aid in the effective use 
of beamtime when testing. 
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• The test suite must be intuitive and straightforward to use, to limit the chance of 
mistake on the test day. 
• The test suite must be versatile and easily adjustable to accommodate different 
onboard test approaches. 
• The test suite must limit its internal overhead usage in the DUT to not interfere with 
different testing approaches. 
A common problem with SEE testing lies in the extraction of errors. Another common 
problem is the lack of testing facilities and beamtime to perform SEE tests. When preparing 
for a test, the tester must ensure that the test will not be in vain as it could be months 
before another test can be scheduled. When performing SEE tests, it is important that the 
tester can test efficiently and precisely. 
Before testing, the tester should be able to simulate SEUs in the DUT to analyse the DUT's 
reaction to upsets in various locations. If simulated errors injected into particular parts do 
not affect the system's overall performance, the tester knows that mitigation is less of a 
priority in those areas. In contrast, if the injected error heavily impacts the DUT, the tester 
knows that area is vulnerable to corrupted data and can choose to apply a mitigation strategy 
to strengthen its SEU resistivity. This does not give information on which areas SEUs are 
more likely to occur in, but it shows which areas will be the most affected if an SEU occurs 
there. 
During testing, the tester should be able to interface the DUT and the test it will be running 
through the test suite to track the DUT status. The test suite should be able to identify 
SEUs in as much of the processor as possible to aid the onboard firmware. It should also be 
able to upload new firmware and power-cycle the DUT if needed. 
The specific test executed on the DUT during SEE testing is the responsibility of the tester 
to implement. The test suite will then serve as an interface between the DUT and the tester 
and strive to simplify the test experience. 
Alternatively, an approach such as the “do little” test from Chapter 2.6.2 can be implemented 
where data is only extracted once irradiation is completed. Unfortunately, this would leave 
the tester inherently blind to see critical errors or SEFIs occur in real-time if the DUT is 
executing code. Usually, it is impractical to extract all the available information from the 
DUT in real-time as it can be time-consuming compared to the rest of the DUT's execution. 
It would be much more viable to use the MCU to determine which areas stop functioning, 
and only extract the DUT data when a significant number of errors are reported, or a loss 
of functionality is detected. 
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Defective peripherals in the DUT will need to be detected using different methods depending 
on the peripheral's operation and will be discussed in the following sections. Once the DUT 
detects a loss of functionality, the test station can halt the program, extract all relevant 
data, and resume execution or reset the DUT. 
For the POC in Chapter 4, no radiation tests will be done, as the goal is only to establish 
whether there is a viable way to extract or inject data when needed. 
3.2 Interfacing the DUT 
3.2.1 DUT communication options 
Communication between the tester and the DUT can happen in various ways. This section 
investigates different raw data reading and writing methods from the available 
communication channels between the DUT and the test station, namely UART and JTAG. 
Preference will be given to the method with the least overhead, affecting the executing 
firmware as little as possible. 
3.2.1.1 UART 
One of the most common ways for programmers and engineers to transfer data to and from 
an MCU is by using one of the MCU UARTs for serial communication. It is quick and easy 
to implement and integrates effectively into a debugging workflow. It can be convenient for 
most normal debug operations, but it is also slow at transferring large data chunks. 
Serial communication could be used to read the MCU data by broadcasting all the data in 
the areas of interest or transmitting a summary of errors after a self-diagnosis by the MCU. 
However, transferring data over serial is slow and greatly limits real-time effectiveness when 
sending large messages. Depending on the MCU size, it could take very long to transfer the 
state of every bit and pin accessible. It also creates overhead and slows down other operations 
the MCU might need to execute. 
Further, as this implementation would make it part of the MCU workflow and require the 
MCU to scan the investigated areas itself, it is untrustworthy. It will be directly exposed to 
the same conditions as the rest of the MCU, and the UART communication will disrupt and 
dominate the execution cycles. 
Even if it is easy to implement, an optimal approach when using the UART to verify flight-
ready software elements is only to report the minimum data needed, and significant 
extractions are only done when required to reduce overhead. Using a UART to read large 
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quantities of data will always affect the execution of the host system due to the operation’s 
overhead, which can muddle the SEE sensitivity results of the rest of the system. 
An argument can be made that the additional overhead can be tolerated. If the test's goal 
is to estimate how long the DUT will survive LEO while executing arbitrary firmware, then 
the overhead of using the UART can be accounted for in the test procedure. Further, a test 
that uses firmware to do heavy self-diagnosis to the extent that every possible detected error 
has to be reported to an external device is most likely not running real-world flight-ready 
firmware anyway. 
This is the case for the benchmarks from [63]. They were specifically designed to give effective 
UART output, and the entire benchmark design had a strong focus to try and minimize the 
effect of the UART transmission overhead compared to the actual benchmark execution. 
These benchmarks give no direct indication of a specific piece of flight firmware’s sensitivity 
to SEU, but they provide a good estimation of specific peripheral response in general. Thus, 
using UART communication to extract data from the DUT can be done if care is taken to 
minimize the effect of the transmission overhead. 
Injecting data through UART by telling the MCU in what location to corrupt data is not 
practical. There is little control of when in the execution cycle the data will change, and not 
all addresses are available to be changed by the DUT. However, transmitting data through 
the UART to interact with the program executing on the DUT is common practice and 
could easily be used to enter specific states in the DUT program or control the program flow. 
3.2.1.2 JTAG 
JTAG, as technology, is discussed in Chapter 2.5.4. It gives a dedicated debug port that can 
be used to access the boundary register cells to view the state of all device registers, memory 
latches, and pin states. As such, it can be used to inspect the condition of the entire memory 
map. It can also be used to transfer data into non-volatile device memory for device 
programming or into volatile memory if the memory region is initialised. Several debug 
functions, such as halting, stepping, and resetting the MCU core, are also available. As stated 
in Chapter 2.6.2, this will be the primary method of injecting data into the MCU. 
To use standardised JTAG on the chosen MCU requires that the ST-Link be disconnected 
from the development board JTAG interface. A typical JTAG layout is displayed in Figure 
3-1. The pins are: 
• TDI – Test Data in 
• TDO – Test Data Out 
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• TCK – Test Clock 
• TMS – Test Mode Select  
 
Figure 3-1 Standard JTAG connection and daisy chaining. 
 
3.2.1.3 ST-Link 
ST-Link is STM's modified version of a JTAG programmer and ships with the development 
board. It was created to use the USB full-speed interface to communicate with several IDEs, 
such as Atollic, Keil, and TrueStudio [65]. It also contains a UART-to-serial converter that 
allows the programming device to communicate with an onboard UART on the MCU for 
basic communication and debugging purposes. 
It is slightly slower than JTAG but has the advantage of being plug-and-play on both the 
development boards and the IDEs. Without knowledge of the DUT or the boundary scan 
registers' internal mechanics, it can be nearly impossible to use JTAG to communicate with 
MCUs. Luckily STM provides both the memory map and drivers that allow seamless 
communication via JTAG for debugging purposes, if using ST-Link. 
STM also provides a command-line terminal interface utility, called ST-Link CLI, that can 
be used to automate the programming and debugging of MCUs. This can be controlled 
programmatically by sending the correct commands to the terminal via Python scripting, 
allowing for the automatic scans of the memory map. 
The ST-Link CLI can also be used to change, or inject, upsets into the MCU. Since the core 
can be halted, the upsets injected and the core resumed, the MCU should experience a similar 
situation to SEU. Specifically, that data has suddenly changed when it should not have from 
external factors. 
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3.2.1.4 Sensible application of communication methods 
As seen in Chapter 2.7.2, both JTAG and UART has been used to extract data from devices 
to verify if SEUs occurred. In certain cases, especially when retrieving cache data, only JTAG 
could be used. Thus, it makes sense to design the test suite to accommodate both and leave 
the specific implementation to the tester. However, for fault injection, the UART is not a 
viable option. Luckily JTAG has the capability to inject errors into the MCU discretely. 
As the chosen MCU comes with the ST-Link connected on the development board, and both 
UART and JTAG can be used by using the ST-Link programmer, it will also be the 
programmer used during the testing of this project. However, should there be a situation 
where the ST-Link needs to be switched with a more generic JTAG programmer, only a 
driver change will be required. 
3.2.2 Onboard testing 
3.2.2.1 Peripheral testing 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, several peripherals can easily be tested for 
functionality by the DUT itself.  Many of these tests could also be done for TID testing to 
verify component functionality, as described in Chapter 2.2. This section will look at ways 
to implement these tests, should the need arise for a tester to focus on the effect of SEE on 
specific peripherals. If these tests show some, or complete, loss of functionality of the 
peripheral, such as unsynced clock signals, message or latch corruption, floating or stuck 
A/D readings, or even complete peripheral failure, then more advanced testing methods can 
be investigated regarding the specific peripheral. 
3.2.2.1.1 Flash memory 
The flash memory data integrity can be tested by the chosen MCU's built-in Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) Calculation Unit. Should irregularities occur, the entire memory 
contents can be read out via the data extraction discussed in Chapter 3.2.1.3 and compared 
to a known valid state of the memory to find the error. This could be especially handy to 
also detect errors in areas of the memory seldom used and where changes could have little 
effect and take time to propagate. 
CRC can be used for error correction, but in order to determine SEU locations, it is 
recommended not to use the error correction. Once a model is built from SEU location 
probabilities, the error correction can also be switched on to determine its effectiveness. 
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3.2.2.1.2 Analogue-to-Digital Converter 
To test the Analogue-to-Digital Converter (ADC) a simple predetermined voltage-divider 
voltage can be continuously sampled and compared with the known value. The voltage 
divider can also be powered by the MCU I/O pins, allowing the MCU to toggle between the 
known voltage and ground. 
This setup is displayed in Figure 3-2. Switching it on or off helps to detect if the ADC is 
stuck at a fixed value. Vin is driven by one of the IO pins. If the resistance at Z1 equals the 
resistance at Z2 Vout would be half of Vin. Thus, if Vin is powered, a constant value is expected 
at Vout, and if Vin is not powered, Vout should be ground. 
 
Figure 3-2 ADC voltage divider 
 
3.2.2.1.3 Communication peripherals 
There are various ways to test a communication peripheral’s functionality, and a low-level 
test could be set up for each. However, a low-level test is not needed, as the only interest is 
to determine when a peripheral lost functionality. If a loss in functionality is detected, the 
peripheral registers can be read to determine where the fault occurred via JTAG. 
Specific communication peripherals can be tested on their own. For example, a UART 
receiver could be connected to the transmitter of that same UART. When a message is 
transmitted, the same message should also be received. For other peripherals, like CAN, 
there must be more than one device connected to the communication bus. Otherwise, the 
peripheral cannot function. The easiest way, especially when using MCUs like the STM32-
range with a sizeable peripheral set, is to have multiples of the same peripheral set up and 
connected. Not only does this double the exposure the type of peripheral is experiencing to 
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injected upsets, but most peripherals can monitor the communication bus to verify its 
integrity. If a UART receiver is pulled low for longer than the span of a character, it triggers 
a break condition. For CAN bus, the standard even specifies a break condition if there 
appears to be a physical line break if only two CAN devices are on a network and one stops 
functioning. 
There are various types of break conditions, and implementations differ between peripherals 
and MCUs. Still, in most cases, the peripheral will have error registers or flags inside an 
internal register that can trigger an exception when a break condition happens to allow the 
MCU to see that at least one of the connected peripherals is experiencing a problem. These 
registers or flags could then be extracted via JTAG. 
When running particle radiation tests and not just injecting errors, all peripherals are 
exposed and could be vulnerable to SEU. The chances of a crippling SEU soft error occurring 
on two connected peripherals on the same device should be relatively low. Still, the connected 
peripherals may share resources as they are on the same device. As such, should a shared 
resource, like a clock line, be affected by an SEU or SET, it could potentially disable both 
peripherals. For this reason, it might be better to have a similar, shielded MCU to act as 
the mirror peripherals. This way, the peripheral integrity can be verified independently from 
the DUT. Having a separate device to test communications also allows the user to compare 
if and how peripherals degrade and gives them the freedom to use and try any combination 
of peripheral devices. 
It can somewhat simplify the process if assuming that the exact error does not have to be 
detected when an SEU occurs, but only that one occurred and its functional severity. Should 
a message not be correctly transmitted or received, or corrupted during transmission, the 
system should only have to report that something, somewhere, went wrong. The test station 
can then extract the register values to determine where the SEU occurred. 
For the POC, since it will not test in a hostile environment, the peripherals will be connected 
on the DUT to verify the workings of the SPI, I2C, CAN, and UART devices, except for the 
UART communication to the test station, which the test station itself can monitor. For the 
chosen MCU, these could all be initialised without pin or clock clashes. 
3.2.2.2 Optimizing data extraction for speed 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1.1, outputting large amounts of data through the UART to 
the test station can be time-intensive and impact the DUT's ability to detect SEU as they 
occur. Using JTAG to extract large chunks of memory states might also not be very fast. 
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However, there is still a need for near real-time feedback from the DUT to allow the tester 
to react to functionality losses. 
Since the tester would want to maximise their time with the beam, one approach could be 
to discard the more in-depth accuracy of where SEU occur and instead focus on the DUTs 
durability. This way, the focus is not on determining SEU sensitivity, but rather on SEFI 
sensitivity. Practically, the SEFI rate will be a significant factor in deciding to use the DUT 
for a LEO mission, especially if the DUT's role will not be critical. 
Mitigation can be applied to the board to restore as many SEUs as possible, and data can 
periodically be extracted by JTAG extraction without stalling the core. Rather than remove 
large areas, only small sectors can be read, and the SEU can be found externally by 
processing the extracted data. 
This allows for the processor to be exercised fully without much of the SEE test overhead 
and to spend the maximum time in the beam. This does limit the visibility of SEU but can 
still indicate a DUTs in-orbit lifespan. Another downside to this approach is that the 
collected data will be much less. To make a probabilistic guess to the DUT's resistance to 
SEFI, several runs will be needed to get the minimum number of errors to be statistically 
significant, which might increase testing time anyway. 
3.2.2.3 Optimizing data extraction for accuracy 
One of the reasons to perform SEE testing is to find out which areas of the DUT is sensitive 
to SEE. Mitigation can then be applied more heavily on those sectors, while areas less 
sensitive to SEE can have less mitigation applied. 
To identify sensitive areas, the DUT can be exposed for a short interval, then all data can 
be fully extracted via JTAG, and the beam is reactivated. This process repeats until the 
SEE testing is done. This would allow for large data extractions that can precisely predict 
the SEU cross-section of various DUT elements for the specified beam energy. This does 
mean that short bursts of irradiation might be overshadowed by long extraction times if the 
data extraction process is not quick enough. 
3.2.2.4 Balancing speed and accuracy 
A balanced approach between speed and accuracy will, in most scenarios, be the best 
approach to get the most information while still spending enough time in the beam. The 
easiest way to do this is to have the DUT monitor high-level functionality and output its 
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status through the UART. Once it has detected enough of a loss of functionality a deep 
extraction through JTAG can pinpoint where the remaining upsets occurred. 
Some upsets will be lost or masked, and some might have propagated to create various other 
errors, but this way testing extends the DUTs time in the beam, and injection can be used 
afterwards to replicate the SEE patterns to test if it induces similar results. This should be 
good enough for most mitigation schemes, but also gives an estimate of the durability and 
life expectancy of the DUT in LEO. 
3.2.2.5 Interfacing with the onboard tests 
As seen in the tests in Chapter 2.7.2, two main interfacing methods are typically used with 
the DUT while being irradiated. The device UART gives real-time feedback about the 
current condition of the DUT, as with the benchmarks in [63], or the DUT is irradiated, and 
afterwards, sections of memory are extracted through JTAG which it can be compared to a 
known correct state and errors can be calculated by analysing the differences between the 
known state and the extracted one, such as with the cache test in [57]. Some tests also used 
a combination of these two options. 
To build a test suite that can be used to enhance SEE testing of MCUs both of these 
communication methods, at minimum, need to be compatible with the system. The tester 
will need to be able to dictate when and where to extract data through JTAG. If the DUT 
test uses UART output, the system should parse this output to react if certain messages are 
detected automatically. 
For example, the benchmarks in [63] give YAML parsable output over the UART that list 
where errors are found. Should a significant number of errors be detected the test could be 
stopped, the beam disabled, the core halted, and a full data extraction could be performed 
via JTAG. This allows real-time tracking of the error score and gives in-depth information 
regarding exactly which bits are incorrect and can be used to determine biases, such as if 
bits flip easier from high to low or vice versa. 
Given that different tests might have other data sent over the UART, the tester should be 
able to modify the way the system parses this data and reacts to it. 
3.3 Test Suite Adaptability 
To accommodate multiple MCUs and a variety of test scenarios the test suite must be 
designed in such a way that a tester can easily modify certain sections to suit their needs 
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without having to alter the entire program or setup. This section will briefly mention some 
relative design points relating to this customizability. 
3.3.1 Programming Languages 
To maximise the ability of testers to be able to customize the test suite to suit their needs 
the test suite must be programmed from languages that are popular in the data science 
community, easy to read to aid in code modification, easy to install and get an environment 
set up, and functional enough to achieve the desired goals. To this end, Python was selected 
as the primary programming language. 
Node.js is a server-side platform that uses JavaScript as programming language and is also 
used later in the development process to enable enhanced, fluent and easier-to-operate GUIs. 
GUI screens are made with basic implementations of standard HTML, CSS and JavaScript 
and are very easy to customize or change. This is, however, optional. A Python-based GUI 
can be sufficient and easily swapped in by the tester. 
Both JavaScript and Python are extremely popular in South Africa, and both have ample 
documentation online for most imaginable scenarios. However, it is important to note that 
the JavaScript-based GUI is just used for ease-of-use, not for any sort of calculations as it 
does not handle floating-point numbers well. All core functionality is implemented in Python. 
3.3.2 Test Configurability 
It is important for the test suite to adapt to specific test needs. As such, the development of 
all critical parts of the system will be independent. This will allow testers to change certain 
modules without affecting the rest of the system. All modules communicate with each other 
with basic APIs. The final version of the APIs at the completion of the project is given in 
Appendix B. 
Should the benchmarks from [63] be used, the UART module could then be configured to 
automatically filter the DUTs YAML output, and automatically start a full data extraction 
via JTAG once a certain number of errors have been reported. Should there be a need for 
the test station to operate SEL detection hardware, the Devices module could be updated to 
drive the hardware. Should the user want a different communication protocol, the 
StateMachine module can be modified. Should there be a need to use a custom driver for a 
specific JTAG programmer or MCU the Driver module can be replaced. 
This modular approach uses modules that can easily be modified or entirely replaced to 
adapt to any testing need, as long as all modules still adhere to the relevant APIs. 
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3.3.3 JTAG Drivers 
The JTAG driver, in this application, is the piece of code that is used by the Python script 
to drive the JTAG programmer. Different JTAG programmers will need different drivers to 
work. As mentioned in the previous section, as long as all APIs are adhered to, the driver 
can be a custom-designed one just for a specific DUT. It can be a more enhanced driver 
capable of driving multiple different types of MCUs. It can even be official software from the 
DUT manufacturer that is manipulated through calls to the operating system, as is the case 
for the POC in Chapter 4. 
3.3.4 Hardware Adaptations 
For some tests, it might be acceptable to simply connect the DUT to the test station and 
start testing. However, especially for higher energies, it becomes important to have safety 
electronics to protect the DUT from damage caused by destructive SEE. For the SEE test 
in Chapter 5, with particle energy of 66MeV/particle, switches were added to the USB cables 
that lead to the DUTs to be able to power-cycle them should the need arise. For tests with 
particle energies over 180MeV, SEL becomes a significant concern and SEL detection and 
prevention circuits are needed. It is also better to keep the DUT unpowered while not being 
irradiated as that prolongs its testing lifespan. 
The test station should have I/O pins that can be connected to whatever hardware 
adaptations are deemed necessary and are controlled by the test station software. As with 
the other modules, the method of operation is completely controllable and modifiable by the 
users. 
3.4 Testing Station 
As humans cannot be near the vault while the beam is being delivered, remote 
communication with the DUT is needed. However, both UART and JTAG programmers 
connect to a host system through USB, which cannot easily communicate over long distances. 
For USB 2.0, USB cables are restricted to a maximum length of 5m, as per the USB 2.0 
specification. For USB 3.0 no absolute maximum length is specified, requiring only that 
cables meet electrical specifications. Practically, too long lengths of wire will not reliably 
transfer data due to power loss and parasitic effects. For AWG 26 wires in copper cabling, 
the maximum practical length is only 3m [72]. 
As seen in Chapter 2.4, the vaults at iTL have built-in ethernet cables. This allows 
communication between devices inside the vault and in the control room. Thus, a testing 
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station is needed that can convert the communication between ethernet and what the DUT 
requires. This test station can also be responsible for controlling any safety hardware 
connected to the DUT. 
3.5 M onitoring Station 
The monitoring station is from where the tester monitors and controls the DUT. It is 
managed directly by the user and communicates with the test station over ethernet. It needs 
a good user interface to allow for ease of operation and must be able to parse incoming data 
for SEU. 
3.6 Iterative Design Approach 
With the desired test suite laid out in this chapter, an iterative design approach can now be 
implemented to build the test suite to execute its desired functionality. This process was 
broken into three steps: 
• Proof of Concept (POC): A POC is built to determine if the JTAG interface can 
practically be used to extract and inject data into the MCU. This version is not tested 
in a SEE test. 
• Iteration 2: The biggest problems of the MCU are addressed: interface speed and 
lack of a test station. The GUI is also adjusted to better suit SEE testing 
environments. This version is then tested in a real-life SEE test at iTL to analyse its 
performance. 
• Iteration 3: UART communication is added, and existing features that did not 
perform to satisfactory levels, such as the user interface and network reliability, are 
either improved or completely overhauled. A method of simple automation is also 
added to aid in both device monitoring and fault injection. This version still needs to 
be tested in a real-life SEE environment. 
  





4. Iteration 1: Proof of Concept 
 
The previous chapter explored the various aspects needed for the test suite. From these 
aspects a practical test setup can be made to verify the validity of the design approach. 
Before research time is spent developing a full system, it is prudent to first test if the core 
methodology will be practically usable, and if so can further be developed into a more usable 
program. 
The Proof of Concept (POC) is designed to test the core functionality of this project. This 
chapter describes the implementation of this stage of the design. 
4.1 Description of Iteration 
As seen in Chapter 3.2.1, it is often impractical to extract all the available information from 
the DUT in real-time. It would be much more viable to use the MCU to determine which 
areas stop functioning and only extract the DUT data when a significant number of errors 
are reported, or a loss of functionality is detected. Alternatively, an approach such as the 
“do little” test from Chapter 2.6.2 can be implemented where data is only extracted once 
irradiation is completed. Unfortunately, this would leave the tester inherently blind to see 
critical errors or SEFIs occur in real-time if no other communication with the DUT is 
established. 
For the POC, no radiation tests will be done, as the goal is only to establish whether there 
is a viable way to extract or inject data when needed. If it is found that the DUT cannot 
reliably be interfaced through JTAG, a different approach will need to be implemented. 
This iteration consists out of a testing station, which will be a standard PC, connected via 
USB to the ST-Link debugger, which is directly connected to the MCU through the 
development board via JTAG and UART. The ST-Link debugger manages the conversion 
between UART and JTAG signals for the MCU to serial for the PC. This is shown in Figure 
4-1. 
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Figure 4-1 The connections between the PC and the DUT 
Communication between the PC and the ST-Link debugger will be managed through the 
use of a Python script that will consist of three threads: a Graphical User Interface (GUI), 
a virtual COM port listener, and the ST-Link controller. The virtual COM port listener 
listens for UART transmissions from the DUT, while the ST-Link controller can send 
commands over the virtual COM port to the DUT UART and invoke the ST-Link CLI 
though the terminal.  
4.2 DUT configuration 
Chapter 2.2 lists the more commonly used peripherals for satellite use. To accommodate 
these peripherals, the DUT can be flashed with firmware initialising the peripherals and 
performing fundamental analysis to check whether they appear functional. 
The DUT will determine defective areas by running a CRC check for flash memory 
validation. It can run multiple timers and compare the time difference to see if one stalled. 
By reading a fixed, pre-determined voltage with the ADC, its functionality can be verified. 
Having one UART, one SPI, one CAN, and one I2C communicating with another identical 
MCU that can validate the data sent and received could be used to detect errors in their 
operation. 
4.3 Test Station 
The DUT is connected to a PC, which acts as the test station, through serial communication 
over UART and JTAG. A Python script on the PC allows the virtual com port connected 
to the DUT to be monitored and also operates the communication driver for the JTAG. 
In this design stage, the testing station is also the monitoring station, connecting to the 
JTAG port on the DUT to extract and inject data and the UART on the DUT to monitor 
the system functionality. 
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4.3.1 UART communication 
Regular communication between the DUT and the PC is vital and needs to be continuously 
verified to ensure the DUT is still functional. Should a SEFI occur or the UART break down, 
the monitoring software will not be able to communicate with the DUT. 
For serial communication between the DUT and PC a certain pattern was set up to regulate 
communications: 
$$<cmd><len><message>&& 
The commands are listed in Table 4-1, with <cmd> being the command type, <len> the 
length of the message, and <message> the message itself. 
Table 4-1 POC UART communication protocol 
Command Process Example 
1 Communication verification: 
Transmits a number as the message and 







Expects $$1211&& in 
return 
2 ADC readout: 






3 Peripheral Status: 
Requests the status of a specified 
peripheral. 
Message: 0 -> UART2 
Message: 1 -> CAN1 
Message: 2 -> SPI1 
Message: 3 -> I2C2 
Message: 4 -> I2C3 
Message: 5 -> SPI3  






MCU sends status of all 
peripherals to PC 
4 Automatic mode: 
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The DUT should always respond to a command from the PC. To verify the DUT is 
functional, the PC periodically sends a <cmd=1> with an integer to the DUT, which then 
returns an incremented integer, confirming that the core functionality is still active. Should 
the DUT not give a valid response, the MCU core can be halted via JTAG, and the memory 
dumped to the PC to determine where the error occurred. The DUT can then be restarted. 
If the MCU does not want to initialise correctly, an error may have occurred in the firmware. 
The monitoring software then validates the firmware on the DUT and reflashes it if 
necessary. 
Commands with <cmd=2> and <cmd=3> allow users to manually initialize tests for the 
peripherals as described in Chapter 3.2.2. Commands with <cmd=4> allows the DUT to 
continuously scan all sections for functionality loss. 
4.3.2 Implementation of fault detection and injection 
To extract and inject data from the MCU, the ST-Link protocol and programmer was used. 
On the test station PC, the ST-Link CLI interface was used to communicate with the JTAG 
TAP via the ST-Link programmer on the development board. Most ST32 boards will support 
ST-Link, but the ST-Link CLI also functions with certain JTAG programmers enabling 
support for a broad range of processors. The process implemented mimics the action of a 
user manually opening a terminal window, entering the correct call to ST-Link CLI, and 
then reading the output. 
A Python library was developed to interface between a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
controlled by a user and up to two MCUs at once. This allows easy operation by the user. 
Connecting up to two MCUs allows the operator to use one as a shielded communications 
monitor if the POC should ever be in a radiation test environment. This library also detects 
the serial communication from the MCUs UART over virtual com ports and uses the 
communication protocol as described above. The ST-Link Controller part, which controls 
the JTAG communication and UART transmits from the PC to the DUT is shown in Figure 
4-2. 
4.3.2.1 Python library 
The developed library uses the command line to call the ST-Link CLI with the correct 
parameters to achieve either a data read or a data write, or manipulate the MCU core. This 
is the same as if the user were to manually enter these commands into the command line to 
run the ST-Link CLI application. It dramatically increases the speed and accuracy as it 
operates much faster than a human operator could. This is shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2 The operation of the ST-Link controller module 
The core functionality of the library allows users to quickly search for all available devices, 
connect with those devices, read single bytes or 32-bit words, dump bigger sections of 
memory into files, write to the MCU memory map in single bytes or 32-bit words, halt, reset 
and step the MCU core, set and clear breakpoints, read or write to the MCU core registers 
(device must be halted), and flash new firmware. It also lists all available com ports, connects 
with selected com ports, transmits messages, and monitors the connections for incoming 
messages. 
Since one of the goals of the POC was to determine if this system is fast enough to be used 
in a real-life radiation testing environment, each function also has a timed version which can 
be accessed by calling "_time_<functionName>(<parameters>)", which executes the 
default function and returns the time the execution took. 
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4.3.2.2 GUI 
Repeatedly typing commands or manually calling functions can be a very impractical way 
to do SEU testing. As seen in Chapter 2.4, should this system ever be used for a particle 
radiation test, there is a big need for effective and accurate testing. As such a GUI was 
developed to allow users to easily operate the developed library mentioned in the previous 
section. 
The GUI makes it easier for the user to monitor the MCU state through the Serial-to-UART 
channel and then call the appropriate JTAG action with minimal effort and room for error. 
This also allows the user to monitor both aspects of communication between the PC and 
MCU in one central application, which is typically not the case for most IDEs. It is also 
possible to import the areas the user wants to read from or write to with a file, allowing the 
user to set up predefined memory maps and injection patterns rather than doing each 
operation manually. 
Devices are automatically detected, and the user can toggle between selected devices. This 
allows them to test one board with fault injection while using another one as a comparison, 
have both boards subjected to fault injection at once if the physical setup allows for it, or 
simply just operate one MCU. 
The MCU core registers can only be retrieved when the MCU is halted, so a shortcut was 
created to halt the core, retrieve the register values, restart the core and display the values 
to the user. The core itself can be halted, stepped, or run, and breakpoints can be set and 
cleared with a single click. 
Reading data can be done either by specifying a start address and size, or importing a list 
of addresses to read from a file. Writing data cannot be done in blocks, and each 32-bit 
register must be written individually either by specifying the start address and data or 
importing a list from a file. A screenshot of the GUI is provided in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3 POC GUI 
4.4 Testing the POC 
The core focus to test for with the POC is functionality and speed. In this case, functionality 
refers to the system's ability to mimic the ST-Link CLI abilities and those of traditional 
IDEs to verify if JTAG can be used to extract and inject data, and speed refers to the 
system's execution time while performing data extractions. Other features, such as the 
UART communication, can be built upon in further iterations. 
4.4.1 Functionality Testing 
As the POC directly uses the ST-Link CLI, it should be able to perform all the operations 
of the ST-Link CLI. In turn, the ST-Link CLI is supposed to be able to perform its full range 
of features such as reading or writing to the DUT, halting, resuming or stepping the core, 
and uploading new firmware. 
To test the ST-Link CLI the test MCU was connected to the PC, and every command 
available from the ST-Link CLI was manually entered and the output inspected. Any 
operation that would lead to a change in state of the DUT, such as halting the core or 
injecting data, was verified against a dedicated IDE, namely TrueStudio, to verify the 
operations were performing as expected. 
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Then the POC implementation was activated, and every available operation from the ST-
Link CLI was rerun by the POC, this time comparing the output to that of the ST-Link CLI 
and TrueStudio. 
To test the read and write abilities certain areas were read, some data changed and written 
back to the MCU, and read again to verify the changes. This process was repeated between 
the developed solution, ST-Link CLI and TrueStudio. 
4.4.2 Speed Testing 
When injecting errors to the DUT, speed is not critical, as the core can be halted and 
resumed as needed to create a pseudo-real-time simulation. However, when extracting data, 
the extraction speed is very vital. If it takes too long to extract significant amounts of data 
from the DUT it will either be impractical in a real SEE test, or the amount of output will 
have to be reduced, possibly leading to a loss of information. 
To test the POC data extraction speed, an area of the SRAM was selected and repeatedly 
read. By performing this action enough, an average time can be determined to read a chuck 
of memory and the variance in execution times. 
4.5 Analysis of the tests 
This section analyses the tests performed in the previous section. 
4.5.1 Functionality analysis 
Comparing the custom library against the dedicated STM software shows that the developed 
library includes the full ST-Link CLI functionality. This is logical as it uses the entire ST-
Link CLI as is. It is also seen that all of the ST-Link CLI operations work on the selected 
MCU.  
When compared with the functionality of compatible IDEs, such as TrueStudio, it is 
noticeable that certain IDE abilities are superior, such as setting breakpoints and keeping 
track of program execution while stepping the core. However, this is not as important as 
reading and writing data via the ST-Link programmer. The developed solution adds 
functionality by allowing multiple boards to be connected and allowing the serial COM ports 
to be monitored, which cannot be done in the ST-Link CLI or TrueStudio. The developed 
solution could also read and write everywhere the dedicated software could. 
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It was also noted that uninitialised peripherals could not be permanently written to, 
regardless of using the POC, the ST-Link CLI or TrueStudio. The DUT documentation does 
not mention this, but it is speculated that to keep the device as power-efficient as possible, 
peripherals not in use are switched off and are not powered. The registers can be read, and 
the state can be changed via JTAG, but the moment the JTAG TAP releases control back 
to the DUT after the write it resets to a low. For this reason, all peripherals that are of 
interest need to be initialised, especially if their state is volatile.  
4.5.2 Speed analysis 
In terms of speed, the developed solution is overall faster to use than the ST-Link CLI, as it 
cuts the need for the user to call the ST-Link CLI and type every command manually. Still, 
it takes longer to execute if only the time to complete the commands is considered, thus 
excluding the time it would have taken a user to type the command. This is because the 
developed library is only a wrapper for using St-Link CLI, and every time the developed 
solution needs to communicate with the DUT via JTAG it first needs to initialise the ST-
Link CLI, wait for it to finish executing and close, then finish its own execution. This does 
produce a lot of overhead. 
Further, due to the way ST-Link CLI works a maximum of 19 commands can be executed 
per application call. This means that if 20 bits need to be injected into the DUT, it will take 
two calls to the ST-Link CLI. Thus, there will be double the time spent on initialising, 
discovering the board, connecting to it, closing the connection down again, and closing ST-
Link CLI itself. This produces even more overhead. 
When measuring the execution speed for extracting a 1kB chunk of memory, the average 
allocated memory per peripheral, it also revealed that speed is depended on whether it was 
extracted in the form of bytes, half-words, or words. 32-bit words took an average of 429ms 
to extract the 1kB chunk of memory and are 29.69% faster to read than half-words and 
59.8% faster than bytes. Intuitively this does make sense as it would take four byte-sized 
reads through JTAG to extract the same amount of data as one word-sized read, and the 
MCU itself uses a 32-bit architecture, which requires extra cycles to process half-word and 
byte operations. These measurements are shown in Figure 4-4. 
As shown in Figure 4-4, there is a large variance in execution time for the same actions, 
making it hard to track when the command is executed accurately. The time for Byte reads 
vary from 557ms to 1093ms, half-words vary from 800ms to 437ms, and 32-bit words vary 
from 809ms to 322ms. This variance is mostly because the PC does not prioritise the console 
command every time it is called. This variance can be almost double the fastest execution 
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time and will be inherent to using the ST-Link CLI. The variance also appears to be random, 
regardless of what else the PC is executing. 
The data is sorted from high, the longest execution time, to low, the shortest execution time, 
as that makes the variance more visible. In practice, there appears to be no constant pattern 
to when operations take longer to execute, even when taking 104 samples instead of 100, and 
if the PC is executing complex tasks, like video rendering or idling in the background, it also 
does not make a visible difference. 
 
Figure 4-4 1kB extraction speeds, sorted high to low 
This data read for this test is also a 1kB chunk of memory consisting of adjacent memory 
addresses, for example, from 0x00000000 to 0x00000399. It can become a much slower and 
more tedious process for peripherals as the needed registers are not adjacent memory 
addresses in the memory map. As such, a single call needs to be made for every non-adjacent 
register, no matter how small it is. All of these calls will also need to be mapped, as calls to 
unallocated memory addresses return an exception. This quickly becomes a low-level effort 
of finding which specific memory addresses are available to the specific DUT and might need 
to change for other MCUs. 
For the chosen MCU it takes roughly 10 minutes (616s) to extract every readable bit from 
the processor. This means that 90-minute exposures in a radiation environment will need to 
be done to limit the read time to 10% of the total test time. For 8-hour testing slots, this is 
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4.5 The conclusion from the POC 
The developed POC solution proves that it is possible to read data from and inject data to 
the DUT. However, on its own, it is not suited for SEE testing as it simply takes too long 
to extract all information. The timing can also vary depending on what the PC and its 
operating system are busy doing and prioritising. This is due to the ST-Link CLI that needs 
to be initialised for every call and then needs to detect and connect to the correct DUT. This 
relies heavily on the operating system, which might not prioritise it. 
When combined with onboard fault detection to only extract data from defective areas, it 
becomes a more viable option. Still, as a result, any faults the DUT does not detect or that 
causes it to become completely unresponsive will be missed as mass data extraction is tedious 
both due to the effort of mapping all available registers and the time of extraction. 
For fault injection, the speed issues do not matter as much, as the device itself can be halted 
and unaware of the injections. Since the injection process can be done anywhere, there is 
much less of a time constraint for overall execution speeds. 
This approach's advantages are that it can interface with any MCU that supports ST-Link, 
which is a substantial number of devices and gives designers more flexibility to choose an 
MCU that perfectly fits their needs. It can also function as a stand-alone program or interface 
with the DUT directly via serial communication. It gives complete control over the DUT 
and can execute halts, reboots, and firmware uploads if needed. 
4.6 Improvements for the next iteration 
The POC shows potential, but it needs some alterations to be effective in a SEE testing 
environment. There are two significant concerns with the POC implemented solution. Its 
execution speed is slow, limiting testing flexibility, and it needs to be connected directly to 
the user PC, which cannot happen in a radiation test environment. 
It is also tedious to hunt for specific memory addresses that are valid to read from the DUT 
documentation and quickly become very device-specific. Using the DUT to detect defective 
areas can quickly become very low-level and device-specific and make it hard to test real-life 
flight mock-ups. Execution speed is also very system-dependent and time-varying, which 
could lead to sizeable cumulative timing inconsistencies.  





5. Iteration 2: Getting test-ready 
 
Chapter 3 explored the design's various aspects, and in Chapter 4 the core functionality was 
implemented. It was possible to read and write to the DUT, meaning that data extraction 
and injection is possible. However, several problems presented themselves and more 
functionality is needed before the system can be practically used. 
This chapter describes the process of converting the POC to a system that is ready for a real 
SEE test at iTL. After the improvements, the system is tested, and the usability is re-
evaluated to further mature the system. 
5.1 Description of Iteration 
The POC discussed in the previous chapter required the DUT to connect to the tester's PC 
with a USB cable. USB cables cannot be longer than a few meters, and since the tester 
cannot go into the radioactive environment found inside the testing vault, a dedicated testing 
station is needed inside the vault that connects to the DUT through the USB port to still 
have access to the ST-Link programmer and JTAG interface, while allowing the tester to be 
able to monitor and control the testing from outside the vault. 
From Chapter 2.4, it is known that there is the option of ethernet communication to and 
from the vault. There is also a shielded area to protect monitoring devices inside the vault. 
To still use both the USB-to-UART communication and connect to the ST-Link programmer 
and connect to the tester PC outside the vault, a Raspberry Pi was selected to serve as a 
test station inside the vault. 
The Raspberry Pi has ethernet and multiple USB ports allowing connection with multiple 
devices, including storage devices for logging purposes. It also has GPIO pins, which can be 
used to interface with hardware protection circuits between the DUT and the Pi, such as 
SEL detection circuits. 
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This also allows the use of Python on the Pi as it comes pre-installed. Also active by default 
is SSH, which can be used to communicate over networks and move files between connected 
devices, allowing for quick extraction of log files and easy uploads of DUT firmware of 
program changes remotely. 
The POC also struggled with execution speeds as it was using an entire third-party program 
just for sending singular commands. The system's execution speed might be drastically 
improved by replacing the ST-Link CLI with a dedicated custom driver. 
This iteration will be focused on including a dedicated test station in the system and reducing 
the execution time of JTAG operations by implementing a custom driver to replace the ST-
Link CLI. After these additions, the system is tested at iTL to gauge its effectiveness in a 
proper test environment. A system diagram is shown in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1 System Diagram for Iteration 2 
5.2 Custom JTAG Driver 
As seen in Chapter 4, the POC showed that reading and writing to the DUT memory and 
peripherals is possible but that it is not test-ready. With the POC, the ST-Link CLI was 
used as a device driver to communicate to the DUT. This led to execution speed problems 
because of the way the ST-Link CLI was called and used. It would be much more effective 
to be able to search for the DUT, connect to it and then stay connected for the duration of 
the test. A lot of the overhead is then mitigated simply by not opening and closing external 
programs every time a command is sent. 
A different and more efficient driver is needed to connect the software to the DUT to do 
this. As this research was being done, multiple groups led attempts at open-source libusb-
based, Python-driven drivers for the STM32 family [67, 68]. Their approach was to use a 
fast, effective C library called libusb that provides generic, user-mode, version-agnostic access 
to USB devices to aid in automated code flashing and debugging [66]. Libusb is extremely 
popular and typically ships with Linux and can be installed on most other operating 
platforms, including Windows. Due to its popularity, there are interface libraries available 
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in most programming languages, including Python, through a library called PyUSB. With 
the libusb and PyUSB combination, arbitrary data can be sent to any USB device. 
Unfortunately, both teams did not have complete drivers and were still under extensive 
development at this research time. Therefore, as described in Chapter 5.3, additional headers 
were added to the Protoboard connected to the Pi so that a bare-bones version of the driver 
could be developed to suit this project's needs. 
5.2.1 Implementation 
The ST-Link driver protocol was partially reverse-engineered by monitoring the DUT and 
ST-Link CLI communication over the USB data lines with an oscilloscope to capture the 
raw data being transferred. Because USB communication is either at 5V or ground the 
oscilloscope trigger was set up to capture a snapshot of the data if it passed 4V. 80% of the 
full voltage was chosen to both catch signals not completely at 5V and to not falsely trigger 
on system noise on the data lines. This snapshot was then saved to the PC as an image, and 
the message data visually extracted. By sending different commands through the ST-Link 
CLI and monitoring the physical data sent, most of the standard command values could be 
found. The setup used is shown in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2 Using an oscilloscope to decipher the communication patterns between the ST-
Link driver and the DUT. 
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This did lead to a loss of functionality, as not all communication data was deciphered. Only 
the minimum was implemented to get the application working, with the idea that this driver 
could be switched out for the ones developed by [67] or [68] once they are completed. 
5.2.2 Analysis 
The bare-bones driver could only connect in hot-plug mode with the frequency of 4MHz as 
that is the max the chosen MCU can operate at. It can read and write 32-bit registers, halt 
and resume the core and read and change the core registers. It cannot set or clear 
breakpoints, retrieve the ST-Link programmer serial number or connect in any other mode. 
Practically it can also not reliably work when connected to more than one DUT at a time 
due to the lack of a serial number as the identifier. 
This was, however, enough to test one DUT at a time in the particle radiation vault, and 
the average read speed, tested in the same manner as in Chapter 4 by repeatedly reading a 
1kB memory chunk went down from 429ms to 113ms, which is a 3.8x reduction in individual 
command execution speed. Figure 5-3 shows the comparison between the custom driver and 
the POC driver implementations when reading 32-bit words. The variance seen in the POC 
implementation is still relevant, with the custom driver taking between 84.7ms and 213ms. 
 
Figure 5-3 Driver comparisons of 1kB extraction speeds, sorted high to low 
The time to extract all data from the chosen DUT is down to 72s, compared to the 616s. 
This means the new driver can read all data from the device 8.55 times faster and is much 
more manageable for real-life radiation testing. As expected, not having the overhead that 
comes with using the ST-Link utility directly impacts the speed performance. To limit the 
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of 720s, or 12 minutes. This is remarkably faster than that of the POC, which would have 
required 90-minute exposures for a similar overhead percentage.  
One problem with the bare-bones driver is that it is not completely compatible with all 
MCUs when it comes to writing to the Flash memory while the MCU is operational. The 
chosen DUT, the STM32L452RE, needs to unlock the Flash memory before any writing to 
that area can be done, which for this MCU is possible and can be done by writing specific 
values in order into the FLASH_OPTKEYR register [69]. This might be different for other 
MCUs, even if they are from the same brand. However, all read and write operations to 
SRAM were tested on and work on both the STM32F411E and STM32F334R8. As all three 
MCUs use the same ST-Link debugger and the same JTAG clock speed, testing the data 
extraction speed revealed almost identical results for all three MCUs. 
Conclusion: The custom driver is a bare-bones implementation that can read and write 
data to the selected MCU much faster than the previous POC implementation. It also shows 
potential for near direct plug-and-play functionality for other STM32 MCUs that use the 
ST-Link debugger. 
5.3 Test Station Design 
The Raspberry Pi needs to switch the DUT on or off, monitor the serial communications if 
needed, and connect with the ST-Link programmer on the development board and the user 
on the outside of the vault via ethernet. A block diagram of the test station is given in Figure 
5-4.  
Power is supplied by a standard Raspberry Pi charger, the 5V fan is connected to 5V and 
GND on the GPIO, USB storage consists of standard memory sticks connected to the Pi’s 
USB ports, and the data lines and 5V go directly to the DUTs from the USB connector via 
a standard USB cable. The switches are connected to the GND line of this cable to control 
current flow to the DUTs through GPIO pins, allowing the operator to remotely switch the 
DUTs on or off. Both JTAG and serial communication is transmitted via the data lines on 
the USB cables. 
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Figure 5-4 Block Diagram of Iteration 2 Test station 
As the DUT was not going to be executing code for these tests, as noted in Chapter 5.1, the 
UART communication was not enabled because the DUT will not be able to use it. The 
focus is on the efficiency of the JTAG and the system overall. 
5.3.1 Hardware protection 
Certain SEEs have destructive effects, and one commonly found in particle radiation testing 
is SEL. To restore cells struck by SEL, power must ultimately be removed from those cells. 
As it is time-sensitive before damage occurs and hard to pinpoint where the SEL occurred, 
the entire device is typically power-cycled, and no information is captured regarding the 
whereabouts of the SEL in the DUT. 
For the test performed in Chapter 5.5, the particle energy was 66 MeV with the option to 
degrade it lower, and is below 180 MeV, where SEL usually starts occurring. As such, no 
SEL protection circuits were added. 
There is still be a need to power-cycle the DUT to prevent other effects, such as TID which 
is also happening in SEE testing, and it would be beneficial if it is off while not directly in 
the proton beam to avoid unnecessary SEE that could damage it, so hardware has been 
added to switch the DUT on or off. 
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This was done simply by connecting MOSFET switches on the ground line between the 
Raspberry Pi and the DUTs. The switches are controlled from the Pi's GPIO pins, which 
can be controlled from the software. A schematic of a single switch is given in Figure 5-5. 
This switch is implemented on the ground line of the USB cable connecting the Pi to the 
DUT 
For this project, the IRF510 Power MOSFET was used as it was readily available and has 
a very low resistance, thus having a small effect on the overall operation of the DUT. The 
MOSFET reliability has not yet been tested in a SEE testing environment, but as it is 
shielded due to the setup, this should not pose problems. For the chosen DUT the voltage 
drop across the transistor was a minimal 18.1mV. On the DUT development board the 5V 
supply is regulated down to 3.3V before being supplied to the DUT. This small drop in 
supply voltage to the 3.3V regulator will not impact the performance of the DUT. 
 
Figure 5-5 Single Switch Schematic 
A protective case for the Pi and the switches was designed and 3D-printed, as that makes it 
more rugged for travel and handling and allows all wires to be clamped in place, avoiding 
bad connections caused by damage to solder points while the test setup was being done. A 
5V fan was also added to aid in air circulation and cooling. 
Connection headers were also added to the USB wires to allow monitoring with external 
probes. This is not a protective measure but is used for development for the driver in the 
sections above. The schematic for the entire case is shown below with a single DUT switch 
and a picture of the finished version, including two switches. 
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Figure 5-6 Test Station schematic with a single switch. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 Picture of Test Station 
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5.3.2 Ethernet Connection 
By using a Raspberry Pi and connecting it to the ethernet network leading outside the vault 
it is possible to gain access to the Pi's input and output streams via SSH. This lets a user 
log into the Pi and operate it remotely as if the input were entered directly into a terminal 
shell on the Pi itself. 
This allows for a design where a Python script can be started on the Pi that implements a 
state machine, waiting for and reacting to user input entered on the other side of the SSH 
connection, creating an easy interface to communicate with the Pi. 
This also allows the Pi's monitoring software to be completely detached in design to any 
ethernet communication protocols. It merely takes standard input as input, and print 
statements get sent to the monitoring station. 
5.3.3 Software 
The software on the Pi was designed to be modular so that individual parts of the program, 
especially the DUT drivers, can be completely replaced. This should make it easier to adapt 
the program for many testing environments and different MCUs. The Python modules are 
shown in Figure 5-8, and the final APIs at the end of this project is given in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 5-8 Modular Python modules used in Iteration 2 
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5.3.3.1 State Machine 
Commands received from the Standard Input are put in a queue and then executed from 
oldest to newest, implementing a FIFO approach. A command has a specific protocol that 
determines which action is being executed, and when received the program executes the 
command and, upon completion, processes the next command. 
Each DUT is represented by a Device class, which splits into a GPIO Driver instance and a 
JTAG Driver instance. This makes it easy to simply change the class definition to operate 
different devices. The commands are sent to the respective instances where they are executed, 
log their results to files if needed, and then print out any feedback into the Standard Output 
where the Monitoring System can interpret it from outside the vault.  
A global Logger class manages writing to files and lets the monitoring system know when to 
download the log files to get backed up outside the vault to minimise the chance of 
corruption. All files are written to three locations locally. One version in the folder the 
application is running in, and two on separate flash drives. 
Commands are space-delimited strings, with the first value being the type of command and 
the next the specific parameters required by that function. They are summarised in Table 
5-1: 
Table 5-1 Communication protocol between the test station and the monitoring station 
Cmd Description 
01 Toggle Alive: If active, every second the DUT is checked if it is still responding. 
02 Set File 1 Location: Set the 1st location for the log file to be stored. 
03 Get File 1 Location: Retrieve the 1st location where the log file is stored. 
04 Set File 2 Location: Set the 2nd location for the log file to be stored. 
05 Get File 2 Location: Retrieve the 2nd location where the log file is stored. 
10 Switch 1 ON: Set the 1st GPIO instance to switch on. 
11 Switch 1 OFF: Set the 1st GPIO instance to switch off. 
12 Switch 2 ON: Set the 2nd GPIO instance to switch on. 
13 Switch 2 OFF: Set the 2nd GPIO instance to switch off. 
20 Full Write On: Write pattern everywhere 
21 Full Write Off: Write pattern only in selected blocks. 
Parameters: Selected memory blocks 
22 Set Pattern 00: Set the pattern to write to 0x00 
23 Set Pattern 00: Set the pattern to write to 0x55 
24 Set Pattern 00: Set the pattern to write to 0xAA 
25 Set Pattern 00: Set the pattern to write to 0xFF 
26 Write Pattern: Writes the selected pattern to the DUT. 
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Parameters: DUT number 
27 Write Memory: Write data to a specific memory address. 
Parameters: DUT number, memory address, data 
30 Read Memory: Reads a data block from specific memory addresses. 
Parameters: DUT number, memory address, size 
40 Start Core: Starts the selected DUT core. 
Parameters: DUT number 
41 Halt Core: Halts the selected DUT core. 
Parameters: DUT number 
42 Step Core: Steps the selected DUT core. 
Parameters: DUT number 
 
5.3.3.2 GPIO Driver 
To control the GPIO pins for DUT power control, the RPi.GPIO module, by default installed 
on recent versions of Raspbian Linux, is used. A class was created that can initialise a pin, 
set its state as either high or low, and reset the GPIO to its safe defaults if the application 
ends. Thus, every pin that is needed can get an instance of this class, and each instance is 
then linked to a DUT device so that it can easily be controlled from the state machine. 
5.4 M onitoring Station 
The monitoring station allows the tester to connect to and monitor the system inside the 
vault. It needs to be on the same ethernet network as the test station and establishes the 
SSH connection to establish communication with the Python state-machine on the Test 
Station. 
As the software on the Pi can be directly controlled through SSH, no interface is needed if 
the PC can establish an SSH connection. This is built-in for most modern operating systems. 
Thus, the user can have direct control by starting an SSH session. However, as seen with 
the POC, it can be a nuisance to type every single command, and as such, an interface that 
makes the Test Station more user-friendly is implemented. 
The Monitoring System is also implemented in Python. This software can establish an SSH 
connection to other devices and will also have a GUI to enable the user to select and 
implement commands effectively. 
To manage both the SSH communication and the GUI each is run in separate threads; 
otherwise, the program continually enters a blocking state. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
5.4.1 SSH  Communication 
To use Python to establish and maintain an SSH connection needed to communicate with 
the software on the Test Station an external library is required. This library is Paramiko 
[70], a pure Python interface around SSH networking concepts implementing a large portion 
of the SSH feature set. By implementing Paramiko, it is easy to establish an SSH connection, 
through which data can then be sent to and received from the connected client. All it requires 
is the IP address and the username and password to log in. 
Paramiko also makes it possible to execute Simple File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) commands, 
which is used to clone all three versions of the log files from the test station to the monitoring 
station, where it gets scanned and compared to each other as well as with the reference 
pattern described in Chapter 5.5.2 to count the amount of SEU. 
5.4.2 Graphical User Interface 
The GUI has a few significant areas on its frame. There is a connection segment where the 
SSH connection to the Test Station is established. Once established, any output from the 
Test Station appears in the terminal display, and any input entered into the terminal input 
is sent as-is via SSH. This allows the user to operate the Pi through a terminal interface if 
needed. 
There is also an area selector. This toggles which memory addresses to perform pattern 
read/write operations on. It is configured by translating the memory map into a text file 
and allows nested groupings to be easier to use. This is handy if certain parts of the device 
need to be excluded from the read/write process. 
The last block contains buttons that automatically compile and send the commands to the 
Test Station as defined in Table 5-1. A local logging system can be used to timestamp when 
the proton beam was activated and what the current used was. Unfortunately, the system 
has no way of knowing when the beam is active or not and needs to be tracked and synced 
by hand afterwards. The GUI is displayed in Figure 5-9.  
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Figure 5-9 Updated Radical GUI 
5.5 Testing at iTL 
On 29 January 2020, this system was tested on the D-line at iTL, with the setup starting on 
28 January 2020. This section describes the test goals, as well as the actual test process. An 
analysis of the entire iteration is done in Chapter 5.6. 
5.5.1 Radiation Test Goals 
The primary goal for this test is to determine the effectiveness of the current system in a 
real SEE environment. Any strengths can then be built upon, and system weaknesses can be 
identified and improved. 
A secondary goal is to get SEU and SET sensitivity data on the selected MCU, the 
STM32L452RE. There is interest from a local company to possibly use this MCU in the 
future. Any information regarding its radiation sensitivity will be of aid to them. 
SEU and SET sensitivity data can also be used to map the probability that individual bits 
will flip when exposed to the beam. Using this map out-of-beam to predict where SEU or 
SET will have caused an upset might be able to allow testers to simulate the effects of the 
proton beam for a certain particle LETs by manually injecting errors into these predicted 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
bits. This map can then be used to inject errors with the same probabilities found during 
SEE testing to view the effects on the DUT when actively executing code without using the 
proton beam. This will aid designers for future tests on this MCU by generating more realistic 
upsets, allowing them to more effectively mitigate the sensitive code sections, be even more 
efficient with beam-time at iTL, or possibly reduce the number of SEE tests that are needed 
altogether. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
5.5.2 Radiation Test Plan 
For the test conducted at iTL, it was decided to attempt to get a baseline SEU sensitivity 
for the chosen DUT. Before the run, the memory map will be filled with different patterns. 
Four different patterns will be used to determine if there is a bias towards bits flipping high 
or low in the case of SEU. The patterns consist of writing 0x0 to all bytes to get all bits low, 
0xff to all bytes to set all bits high, 0xAA (101010102) to all bytes to alternate between highs 
and lows, and 0x55 (010101012) to invert the previous pattern. 
As noted in previous sections, certain areas cannot be written to if not initialised for this 
MCU, and not all device registers are adjacent memory addresses. Before the test, all the 
patterns will be written to the DUT, and the resulting pattern that can then be read back 
is used as a baseline. This baseline can then be compared with the DUT memory after a run 
to determine where they differ and thus an upset has happened. This accounts for the 
uninitialized areas and the necessary areas to initialise the DUT. 
During the SEE test, but before a run, the memory map is filled with one of these patterns. 
The run is then started and the DUT is exposed for a certain amount of time, and then the 
pattern is checked for deviations to see if any bits have flipped. A new pattern is then written 
to the device, a check is done to see if any bits are stuck and did not write, and then the 
process is repeated. 
The core is also halted to avoid program execution and clock signals to mitigate SETs. SETs 
typically only cause upsets in memory elements when arriving as an element’s clock changes 
state, allowing the error to propagate. This will mean that the majority of errors will be 
SEU, and from this a base SEU error rate can be determined. If the error rate is too low, 
the next run can have either a longer exposure or increased beam current to increase the 
error rate to a statistically significant level, but with a small chance of overlapping SEU on 
the same bit. 
When the baseline SEU rate is determined, the core can be resumed, and an increase in 
errors is expected due to SETs causing SEUs more frequently. The total number of SEUs 
can be deducted from this increased number of errors to determine the SET sensitivity. 
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Predicting how many SEU are inherently caused by SET might help satellite developers 
choose better mitigation techniques, as SETs appear to be inputs to the memory elements, 
rather than the transistor directly switching state inside the element, which can more easily 
be detected by safety features such as CRC. 
After all the runs, a baseline sensitivity map, as mentioned in the previous section, can then 
be generated by comparing the baseline patterns with the extracted patterns during the test 
and placing a probability on cells to experience SEU or SET for a certain particle LET. 
Should certain areas of the DUT experience no SEU, while in other areas, many errors were 
induced, this map will reflect those probabilities of SEU and reveal which areas need the 
most mitigation should they be used. 
5.5.3 The Test 
The testing setup was done the day before the test was scheduled and followed the standard 
setup as described in Chapter 2.4. The tests were done on the D-line at iTL. The data room 
was used as the control room for these tests. The radiation test plan, as mentioned in the 
previous section, was followed during testing. Figure 5-10 shows the DUT in line with the 
beam, and Figure 5-11 shows the test station among the other electronics behind the lead 
shield. 
 
Figure 5-10 DUT aligned with the beam 
 
Figure 5-11 Test station on a shielded table 
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During the test, the DUT was exposed six times for a total of 47 minutes. The first three 
exposures were at a beam current of 20nA and comprised of a 2, 5, and 10-minute run. In 
the first run, one suspected upset was detected. For all runs, the beam energy was at 66MeV, 
the highest that was available that day. 
To try and force upsets, the beam current was raised. The rest of the exposures were at a 
beam current of 41nA each, which is the highest it could go for the vault configuration. Each 
exposure was 10 minutes long. No upsets were detected in the DUT during these runs. 
However, the ST-Link programmer, which was also relatively exposed to the beam, became 
unresponsive twice but became functional again both times after power cycling the DUT. 
Fluence data for these tests can be found in Appendix A. 
5.5.4 Testing Issues 
The designed system struggled to communicate over the network and the connection was 
frequently dropped when using the GUI. Due to built-in features to prevent the user from 
clicking the wrong buttons, the DUTs could not be turned on in the GUI if the SSH 
connection is not established. This made most of the GUI redundant during this experiment. 
The code that extracted and analysed the data from the log files from the test station to the 
monitoring station was also locked due to this. However, a user-initiated SSH session directly 
from the command line could stay connected, so the testing was done without the GUI. The 
original analysis scripts, that compare the extracted data to the baseline maps, were called 
per-function in a Python interpreter, bypassing the GUI, and worked as intended. 
The network problems only happened when connecting via Paramiko, so two command-line 
consoles were opened on the monitoring station and manually connected to the test station. 
One was connected with the Python interface on the test station and used to control the 
DUT, and the other one used SFTP to clone all the log files to the monitor station as the 
tests were done. The files were then compared using the original program to find upsets, as 
mentioned above. 
Another concern was that virtually no upsets were being detected, with the core halted or 
not. Initially, the runs were extended, irradiating the DUT longer and giving greater 
exposure. As there were still virtually no upsets, the beam current was increased to the 
facility's maximum for the vault that was being used. After a cumulative 30 minutes of 
maximum exposure, it was decided to move to other tests as other DUTs and systems also 
needed to be tested during the test slot. 
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5.6 Analysis of Iteration 2 
This iteration delivered remarkably faster data extraction rates by using a custom driver, 
and it should be easy to modify for many other STM32 MCUs. It can perform all the basic 
operations needed for this project, but it lacks more advanced features and is, all things 
considered, a very bare-bones driver. However, the speed increase meant that the data 
extraction time was satisfactory for a real SEE test. 
The use of a Raspberry Pi as a test station was overall effective. It is readily available, 
affordable and its operating system, Rasbian Linux, comes with everything used for this 
iteration already pre-installed. There were problems on the test day between Paramiko and 
the Pi. It is suspected to be due to a misconfiguration on the Pi due to human error that 
caused it to identify the autonomous connection from Paramiko as insecure. This issue will 
be investigated in the next iteration. 
The GUI was clunky and completely rendered useless when a connection could not be made 
to the Pi due to "safety locks" placed on the buttons that required the device to be connected, 
even when doing local activities such as comparing downloaded data files to find upsets. 
Luckily, the comparison functions could be called manually from the Python interpreter 
without using the GUI. The GUI could have been better implemented. 
Unfortunately, during the test, only a single upset has been induced, in the SRAM during 
the very first run. This could be because the cross-section of the device might be too small 
for the exposure it experienced, and longer exposures were needed, or exposures with a higher 
current to increase the chance of SEU. It could also possibly be due to a failure in the design 
of the system that resulted in no detections. To verify, after the test, the raw, extracted data 
from the processor was re-evaluated to ensure that the system functioned as it was designed 
to. All data files were compared and identical to the pre-radiation versions, except during 
the first run. No data is generated by any part of the system other than the ST-Link 
programmer, so all data must have originated from there and, supposedly, from the DUT 
down the line. It was concluded that there was indeed only one upset detected on the DUT 
itself. 
This test result does not give us much insight into the tolerance levels of the DUT, because 
there is simply not enough data to eliminate test errors. As a result, no system sensitivity 
map, as discussed in Chapter 7.1, can be calculated. However, the test has served its purpose 
by clearly highlighting some areas in the design that can be improved to provide for a more 
reliable testing experience, which was the primary goal.  





6. Iteration 3: The Improved 
Experience 
 
This chapter further betters the system design by implementing fixes to the shortcomings 
experienced during the SEE test to improve the overall usability and user-experience. 
6.1 Description of Iteration  
In the POC, the designed system takes too long to extract all data from the DUT, limiting 
the effectiveness of the system and that it cannot be used at the testing facility at iTL 
because it would need a human operator in or very close to the vault. This cannot happen 
due to health risks to the operator.  
However, the previous chapter introduced Iteration 2, the second iteration of the design, 
which made use of a custom driver that increased the system speed and allowed for remote 
testing through SSH, by using a Raspberry Pi as a test station inside the vault, connected 
to the user on a monitoring computer outside the vault. 
Iteration 2 was then tested at iTL and barely met the test's needs, and it seriously lacked in 
user experience and was hard to use. The GUI was clunky, with the area to select peripherals 
to read to and write from not navigating quickly or intuitively and with many of the features 
locked due to a design oversight, forcing the user to access the backend code through the 
Python interpreter to be able to use some of the functionality.  
The SSH connection that was supposed to be managed by the software, to let the user focus 
on other aspects of testing, completely failed, and the SSH terminal and file retrieval from 
the testing station had to be done manually. 
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Further, the expectation for the test was to gather a baseline sensitivity map for the DUT, 
namely a probability map that can be used to replicate the SEU pattern. This map could 
then be used to test various firmware applications to inspect the effect of the simulated 
radiation, in the form of injected errors, on the firmware's functionality to detect SEU-
sensitive areas. Should the same firmware be used during a SEE test and similar results are 
achieved as with the injection tests, it would verify fault injection through JTAG as a viable 
way to simulate the effects of SEU on the system. As the test progressed, it became clear 
that virtually no SEUs are being detected and that generating such a probability map will 
not be possible due to a lack of statistical data. 
To improve the design of Iteration 2 these aspects would need to be addressed. A feature 
that was also added is the ability to automatically execute scripts, opening the possibility 
for more automated testing. The lack of a SEU probability map is discussed in Chapter 7, 
which focuses exclusively on fault injection. An updated system diagram is shown in Figure 
6-1. 
 
Figure 6-1 System Diagram for Iteration 3. 
6.2 SSH  Communication 
As the access to the radiation vault is limited, reliable communication between the user and 
the DUT is key. The reason communication dropped between Paramiko, the Python library 
used to establish SSH communication, and the test station is unknown. It is thought to have 
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been a user error when originally setting up the Raspberry Pi, and fixed by reinstalling the 
operating system onto the Raspberry Pi with the default configuration. It was then tested 
on almost all of the original network the connection kept getting dropped on, and performed 
flawlessly. The only physical change between this setup and at iTL was the much longer 
ethernet cable used to link the vault and operations room.  
The fault being gone was slightly problematic because, with the exact cause unknown, the 
problem might still be present and masked by an overlooked element in this verification test, 
so an inspection of how Paramiko was implemented was conducted.  
Initially, the SSH channel was programmed to run in a separate thread to the GUI, 
theoretically allowing both threads to execute with minimal blocking between them. The 
main thread contained the GUI, and a secondary thread the SSH connection. Through a 
deeper inspection of how Python's threads are implemented and after searching for similar 
problems on the internet, it became apparent that Python's main thread will get preference 
over other threads. This can sometimes lead to the secondary threads being slightly blocked 
and can cause problems if the thread needs to be responsive for applications such as 
monitoring an input stream. 
The slight blocking might be disturbing the SSH communication, and the much longer, 
possibly quite old, ethernet cable used at iTL might have aggravated the issue. With this in 
mind, the test setup was replicated on the same network it had been developed on, not the 
one configured at iTL. On this network, the problem has thus far never happened before. 
The only change was to replace the ethernet cable connecting the monitoring station to the 
hub the test station was connected to with a 50m long ethernet. This was done to try and 
mimic the long cable used at iTL to connect the control room and vault. This change is 
shown in Figure 6-2 in red. 
 
Figure 6-2 The system with a replaced, longer ethernet cable. 
   
A connection was established through Iteration 2, as it was when testing at iTL but with 
the reconfigured Pi. Sure enough, the connection consistently dropped within three hours. 
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This is not as regularly as at iTL, but it is assumed the ethernet cable is much older and 
worn down than the one used in this test. As a comparison, a normal terminal console was 
also used to establish an SSH connection and could stay connected throughout an entire day 
before being terminated by the tester. 
Since a normal SSH session stayed connected and the Python implementation consistently 
dropped, it is clear the problem is with the Python implementation. The SSH connection 
was moved to the main thread and the GUI to the secondary. A connection was then 
established to the test station using the Python interface after the change, as well as through 
the terminal console. None of the channels dropped once over three days. 
It was then concluded that this was most likely the original cause, or at the very least, that 
the system is more reliable with this small change. 
6.3 Graphical User Interface  
To implement a better user experience, a more efficient GUI was needed. GUI-building in 
Python is very limited, and it was decided to convert the GUI from Python to Node.js, an 
environment that uses JavaScript as the core programming language. The rest of the project 
remains Python-based. Node.js is an extremely popular platform for web development as 
both server side and client-side scripting can be implemented in one language. The advantage 
to using Node.js is that the GUI can be built out of website components, made from HTML, 
CSS and JavaScript.  
The methodology was to use Node.js to initialise a local web server, which any other device 
can then access on the network through a standard web browser. The GUI is made as a 
traditional website by using HTML for the element layout and CSS for the styling. The 
Electron module was then used to convert this into a standalone application. This has the 
added benefit of running as an executable file, but the assets can still be modified. This 
means an executable can be created containing both the Node.js environment and the Python 
environment, but all Python scripts and HTML, CSS and JavaScript files can be modified. 
This can now simply be copied to the monitoring station PC, without needing to install any 
environments. 
This change made it incredibly easy to create a fluent, responsive interface with easily 
customisable buttons and functionality that is also very intuitive to use. As CSS is used to 
style individual elements, it was also possible to easily add features that are much more 
complex to implement in Python, such as marking certain parts in the console output in 
certain colours; for example, messages coloured red indicate errors or messages coloured 
yellow indicate warnings. A responsive design allows the screen to adapt to any size, even 
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on mobile devices or tablets. Since the SSH functionality is needed to communicate with the 
software on the test station, the Node.js web server interfaces with the Python script on the 
monitoring device to replace the Python-based GUI while still allowing all other, already 
implemented functionality. 
The goal of this GUI is simply to replace the previous one, and all the options have remained. 
However, buttons and commands have been grouped, allowing certain safety features without 
affecting the other parts of the GUI. This enables checks to prevent an attempt to send 
commands meant for the Python script directly into the Pi's terminal. Incorrect commands 
directly into the terminal could possibly cause problems if the script failed to start or crashed 
due to an uncaught exception. This still allowed other functionality like attempting SMTP 
even if the original SSH connection failed or analysing the data extracted from a DUT even 
if no connections are active anymore. Previously, if one part of the system failed, everything 
would be locked. A section for the virtual COM port communications has also been added. 
A screenshot of part of the GUI, where the connection is established, can be seen in Figure 
6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3 Final GUI snippet 
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6.4 Scripting 
Up to this point, controlling the DUT and reading and writing data to and from the DUT 
via JTAG has mostly been done manually. Even when using files to define where to read 
from and write to, the entire file was processed in one go. 
However, what if the user wants to run an initialisation procedure, such as switching on the 
DUT through the GPIO pins, connecting to the DUT, flashing new firmware, waiting for 
confirmation from the UART the DUT is ready to test, and then notify the user everything 
is good to go? Or if, following directly on the initialization, a new script starts executing 
procedures, sending commands over UART to navigate the DUT test procedure and doing 
JTAG reads every 3 minutes until the user aborts the process? 
This can now be realized. In order to further improve the usability of the test suite, the 
ability to use scripts was added. There is a master script that is used to navigate between 
various smaller procedure execution scripts. The master script just links scripts sequentially 
or performs a jump to a previous script in the chain to create a loop. 
The smaller scripts can be filled with any command the user could use to interact with the 
state machine on the test station and an option to delay between the commands by set 
amounts. 
Thus, an initialization script can be made containing instructions to produce the example 
sequence above. A test script can be made for further procedures. A third script can be made 
to upload entirely new firmware, reinitialise the DUT and wait for user input before 
executing another script that repeatedly injects a set number of faults every second by 
halting the core, inserting the data, and resuming the core. 
With this feature added to the project, it greatly expands its useability. Not just for 
simplifying operations during SEE testing, but also for fault injection, as discussed in the 
next chapter. An example script process, that performs the steps executed manually for the 
SEE test at iTL in Chapter 5.5 for two patterns is depicted in Figure 6-4 below. The grey 
blocks are the elements in the master script, and link to their respective secondary scripts. 
Each white block is a step in these secondary scripts. The master script can only progress to 
a new secondary script if the current secondary script reaches its last stage and is released. 
At any point, should the need be there, can the scripting process be halted. 
Running the master script in Figure 6-4 will automatically connect to the test station over 
SSH, start the relevant scripts, power on and connect to the DUT JTAG and virtual COM 
port interface, write 0x0 to all memory addresses, extract those memory values and verify 
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that they did write correctly. At this stage the DUT is ready to be irradiated, and waiting 
for user input, either by clicking “Next” or “Abort”. The DUT can then be irradiated, and 
immediately after the run the user can click “Next” to automatically extract all data, compare 
and search for upsets, and move on to the next script. 
 
Figure 6-4 A depiction of the scripting progress 
 
6.5 Analysis of Iteration 3  
The reworked user interface appears much smoother to operate and is easy to use. It does 
come at the cost of an extra environment, but it can easily be reverted back to a Python-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
based GUI should the need be there. Having the GUI outside of Python also helps to give 
Paramiko and the SSH implementation more time to execute without being blocked, leading 
to more stable network connections. 
The implementation of automatic scripting is valuable for testing devices while the beam is 
not accessible, or for preparing for SEE tests by verifying the implemented mitigation results. 
The main focus of this iteration was user experience. The biggest problem of this iteration 
is that it is untested in a SEE testing environment, as no tests could be scheduled at iTL 
due to safety concerns regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, before conclusions can be 
made about whether the GUI and scripting works in a physical radiation test, a physical 
radiation test will need to be performed. 
  





7. Fault Injection 
 
 
While the development of the test suite itself mainly focused on effective ways to get data 
out of MCUs, JTAG has made it relatively simple to get data in by manipulating actual 
memory cells and peripherals. This will most likely not be used during a real SEE test, but 
can be handy to predict system responses to SEU and verify the effectiveness of mitigation 
techniques. 
This chapter focusses on fault injection through the developed system and possible use-cases 
of fault injection to verify mitigation techniques before SEE tests or to find system 
vulnerabilities. 
7.1 Beam simulation 
If the execution loop of the DUT is kept extremely small, much of the Flash memory and 
SRAM and all the peripherals are active, but not in use. It was hoped to develop a method 
that can determine an MCU baseline SEU sensitivity by initializing the MCU, and then 
halting the core and writing a set pattern to these unused bits. This way, during irradiation, 
most of the DUT can be monitored to see where SEU occurs. After irradiation, the pattern 
can be retrieved from the DUT. Any differences from the original pattern can be classified 
as an upset. 
Upsets should be mostly SEU and not SET due to the clocks being halted. SEL should not 
appear if the energy is low enough, namely below 180MeV/particle. After enough SEUs were 
detected to create a probabilistic model of the device’s SEU sensitivity, the core can be 
resumed, and the test repeated. Hypothetically, the number of errors detected will increase 
and be the sum of SEU and SET. The difference between these two results will be the effect 
of the SETs. 
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The probability of any bit experiencing an SEU or SET can then be mapped on to the DUT 
memory map. This new map can then be used out of the beam to inject errors into the DUT 
in the same distribution as seen during SEE testing, thus simulating the SEU and SET 
effects the beam would induce. Developers could then use this to get a feel for how their 
systems will react when performing SEE tests, without having to continually retest after 
every significant change. 
The DUT can be tested once to get the distribution map, and then the final implementation 
of the DUT, functional and mitigated as it would be in-orbit, can be tested. This could 
reduce in-beam testing needs, especially if a database of these distribution maps could be 
generated for various MCUs. Developers will only have to test their implementation on the 
MCU, saving cost and development time.  
Unfortunately, not enough data was generated during the test described in Chapter 5.5 to 
be able to create such a distribution map, and further testing could not be achieved due to 
COVID-19 safety regulations that were put in place shortly after the first test. 
At this moment, this approach is only hypothetical, and a simple version of this approach is 
suggested here, and can possibly be further investigated in future research. Due to the lack 
of test data, an SEU upset rate is assumed for a hypothetical DUT that only consists of 
eight bytes of SRAM, as that is easy to visualise. This hypothetical DUT has been vigorously 
exposed over R runs of M minutes each with a fixed LET. The total upsets per bit is 
represented in Table 7-1, denoted as ZiBitj, where i is the byte number, and j the number of 
the bit inside that byte. 
Table 7-1 Visualization of upsets across eight bytes of SRAM cells. 
 Bit0 Bit1 Bit2 Bit3 Bit4 Bit5 Bit6 Bit7 
Byte 1 Z1Bit0 Z1Bit1 Z1Bit2 Z1Bit3 Z1Bit4 Z1Bit5 Z1Bit6 Z1Bit7 
Byte 2 Z2Bit0 Z2Bit1 Z2Bit2 Z2Bit3 Z2Bit4 Z2Bit5 Z2Bit6 Z2Bit7 
Byte 3 Z3Bit0 Z3Bit1 Z3Bit2 Z3Bit3 Z3Bit4 Z3Bit5 Z3Bit6 Z3Bit7 
Byte 4 Z4Bit0 Z4Bit1 Z4Bit2 Z4Bit3 Z4Bit4 Z4Bit5 Z4Bit6 Z4Bit7 
Byte 5 Z5Bit0 Z5Bit1 Z5Bit2 Z5Bit3 Z5Bit4 Z5Bit5 Z5Bit6 Z5Bit7 
Byte 6 Z6Bit0 Z6Bit1 Z6Bit2 Z6Bit3 Z6Bit4 Z6Bit5 Z6Bit6 Z6Bit7 
Byte 7 Z7Bit0 Z7Bit1 Z7Bit2 Z7Bit3 Z7Bit4 Z7Bit5 Z7Bit6 Z7Bit7 
Byte 8 Z8Bit0 Z8Bit1 Z8Bit2 Z8Bit3 Z8Bit4 Z8Bit5 Z8Bit6 Z8Bit7 
Thus, the total amount of errors over all the runs for this LET would be 


















Now we can predict that E amount of errors will occur every second, with a probability of 
PiBitj to be in a certain bit. From this, we can inject upsets by halting the core E amount of 
times, determine which bit the upset will be injected to, extract the byte value with JTAG, 
invert the bit where the upset takes place, and write the new byte to that SRAM cell. Then 
the core can resume, and the data injection is completed. Should E be greater than upsets 
can practically be injected per second, then E can be reduced. SEE testing with particle 
accelerators is an accelerated simulation of in-orbit SEE. Thus reducing the upset speed 
would be equivalent to reducing the beam current or the effective particle interactions per 
second. 
Practically, systems are much larger than eight bytes. However, cumulative totals can be 
made of various groups to make the implementation more manageable. For instance, in the 
SRAM example, the probability of which byte the upset will occur in can be calculated first, 
and then a specific bit of the upset will be injected into. 
This should give a more realistic injection pattern and could be used by designers to test 
their designs before SEE testing to see if it will be able to mitigate these effects. If their 
designs do not mitigate these effects, they can determine which areas need further mitigation. 
This can potentially help designers from not having to reperform SEE tests because of 
insufficient mitigation. 
7.2 General Firmware M itigation  
With the addition of scripting, as described in Chapter 6, it is quite easy to test mitigation 
schemes against upsets, even without knowing the DUTs SEU sensitivity. With the 
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mitigation active, the mitigated areas can be targeted through automated injection. Faults 
can be induced while the DUT is running to see its functional effect, or an in-depth look at 
how the mitigation scheme works can be implemented by inducing a fault and stepping the 
core through JTAG several hundred or thousand steps forward and investigating if and how 
the fault propagates. 
Through random injection of all active areas, the areas most sensitive to disruption if struck 
by an SEU can easily be determined. If these areas are critical, software mitigation can be 
applied, such as error-correcting codes, triple modular redundancy or majority voting. If the 
areas are not critical, lesser mitigation can be applied. 
Fault injection can also be used to test built-in hardware error correction components. The 
chosen MCU for this project has a built-in CRC check. By enabling it and bombarding the 
area with induced faults, the resulting efficiency and additional overhead can be tested to 
determine if it is a valid mitigation tool. Further, benchmarks such as [63], which were 
specifically designed to detect and report SEUs, can be tested to determine their exact range 
of error detection and their effectiveness as benchmarks. 
An implementation of this approach was tested where a basic SRAM fault detection program 
was loaded into the DUT firmware. The program scans a predetermined area of the SRAM 
that has been set to all zeros. If it finds any byte that is not all zeros, it increments a counter. 
After the entire area has been scanned, it reports the start address, the end address, and 
counter value over UART. If no faults are injected into the scanned SRAM cells, the program 
successfully reports no errors were found. When 100 errors are injected into the scanned 
SRAM cells, the program successfully reports that 100 errors have been found. So far, the 
program is working as expected. 
But what happens if the area in memory where the counter is stored is also subjected to 
fault injection? Using TrueStudio, the memory location of the counter can be found. Faults 
were then injected into this location, and predictably the counter keeps reporting the wrong 
error values. As the UART output relies on the value stored inside the counter, this is 
expected, as that value is never verified to be correct before being transmitted. This means 
that this system has a vulnerability to upsets if the upset occurs in the same location the 
error counter is stored. 
Using a technique called Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), the DUT program was then 
modified to include three counters instead of just one. Every time an error is detected all 
counters are incremented. Before transmitting the error count, two of the counter values are 
compared with each other. If they are equal, then either an upset occurred in both memory 
locations that changed both values exactly the same way, which is very unlikely, or no upset 
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has occurred in either one of the two counters. However, if they are not equal, an upset has 
occurred in one of the two counters and the third can be used as a tiebreaker. 
After this change, if one of the counter values experiences an upset, it will now be mitigated 
and not affect the output. This mitigation strategy's effectiveness can now also be tested by 
running the program and injecting errors into the counter memory locations. If the memory 
area the program scans is very small, it can finish scanning it quickly and there is less time 
for errors to occur. As a result, the TMR mitigation appears successful. If the area is very 
large, then scanning takes much longer, and TMR fails more constantly as multiple upsets 
affect multiple counter memory locations. 
In this example, the counter memory address was specifically chosen as an injection point as 
it was obvious that it would be a vulnerability for data corruption, leading to a loss of some 
functionality of the program. However, with larger programs, it is much harder to pinpoint 
all of these vulnerable locations manually. 
This is where the scripting, described in Chapter 6.4, becomes valuable. A predefined error 
injection probability distribution can be provided to the system with a higher chance of error 
injection where the tester feels important parts of the code is stored and a lower chance in 
unused or unimportant areas. A script can then be set up that repeatedly injects an error 
according to this distribution and waits a predetermined amount of time or parses the DUT 
UART output looking for errors. If the time between injections is enough to allow errors to 
completely propagate, then if the user sees an error, or the system discovers functionality 
loss from the UART output, the location that was last injected to is most likely vulnerable 
to upsets. If enough upsets are injected and propagated errors found, then a sensitivity map 
similar to the radiation sensitivity map can be determined, mapping the chance that a loss 
of functionality will occur if an upset is induced in that location. 
Applying this approach to the TMR mitigated example above identified five sensitive areas 
in the SRAM, two with a large probability of loss in functionality, namely the starting 
address variable and the ending address variable, and three with a smaller probability of loss 
in functionality, namely the counter variables. Loss in functionality included small issues 
such as incorrect error detection counter or start or end address values over the UART 
output, to major system stalls where an injected error changed the value of the end address 
to smaller than that of the current address being scanned, and the loop exit condition could 
not be met. 
  








Overall, the goal of designing a test suit that allows testers to better prepare for SEE tests, 
verify their particular applied mitigation techniques before testing, help them determine 
cross-sections and SEU sensitivity for a range of MCUs, and boost their efficiency while 
performing SEE tests appears to have been mostly met. 
This section briefly summarises the end product and recaps the process to get there. Then 
the research questions, asked in Chapter 1.5, are discussed. Finally, some recommendations 
for future work are given. 
8.1 Summary of work 
To reach the state the system is in now, research had to be done regarding SEE mechanics, 
SEE testing at specifically iTL, MCU options and technologies, fault injection as a test tool, 
and finally, how MCUs have been tested for SEE until now. This can all be found in Chapter 
2. 
Chapter 3 then merges and converts these research snippets into a practical concept design, 
and lays out the design drivers and major components of this project that would need to be 
implemented, such as the DUT communication and onboard testing, test suite adaptability 
and accessibility, the requirements for a testing station to control the DUT, and for a 
monitoring station that allows testers access to the system from safe distances. 
This chapter then ends with the iterative design approach that was taken, which started in 
Chapter 4 with the design and implementation of the POC. The POC's goal was to determine 
if JTAG is viable as a data extraction and injection tool, as that will need to be a core 
component of the test suite. This was determined by wrapping the ST-Link CLI in a Python 
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script that controlled it to inject faults and extract data. It was found that data could be 
both written and read from the DUT, but the time taken to extract large quantities of data 
was simply too long, at 616s for the selected MCU. To limit this extraction time to only 10% 
of the total testing time would require exposure times of around 90 minutes. 
Chapter 5 introduced the next iteration. Before any work is done on making the system SEE 
test ready, the ST-Link CLI driver was replaced by a custom, Python-based JTAG driver 
that could more effectively utilise the JTAG interface for this application’s specific use case. 
This driver was reverse-engineered by monitoring the ST-Link CLI and the JTAG 
programmer's hardware interactions and lead to a significant increase in operational speed. 
This implementation was around 8.55 times faster than the POC, and for the same 10% 
overhead cap, SEE test exposures would only need to be a much more manageable 12 
minutes. A dedicated testing station was then built that could connect the tester to the DUT 
via ethernet and communicate with the DUT over UART and JTAG. Additionally, a 
hardware interface was included that could control the power supply to the DUTs. 
This iteration was then tested in a real SEE test at iTL. It physically integrated with the 
test setup as described by [15] with minimal effort, but there were some problems in the 
software implementation on the monitoring station that forced the testers to connect and 
operate the testing station manually. 
In Chapter 6, these software implementation problems, namely the defective GUI and the 
incorrect SSH implementation in the Python script, were solved. The Python GUI was 
replaced by a Node.js interface that was easier to customise, more robust and also more 
portable, making it easy to package the entire application for easy use on different PCs. The 
incorrect SSH implementation was solved by resetting the Raspberry Pi used in the test 
station and swapping the GUI thread and the SSH thread so that the SSH communication 
would take main priority. A nifty feature that was also added was the ability to use scripts 
to execute commands automatically. 
The final system is as described in Chapter 6. It consists of a monitoring station and a testing 
station that allows full control over compatible DUTs through UART communication and 
the JTAG interface. Communication between the monitoring station and test station is via 
SSH over ethernet, and a custom driver drives communication between the DUT and the 
test station. This driver was partially reverse-engineered from the original ST-Link CLI and 
allowed quick, effective automation of JTAG features. 
All memory cells and peripheral registers that are accessible to the boundary scan register 
can be extracted to be analysed for SEUs. Depending on the DUT, most of these cells can 
be overwritten, allowing faults to be injected into the DUT to test the effect of SEU on the 
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device firmware. The MCU core can be halted, run, or stepped. The DUT can be power-
cycled, and additional safety hardware can be added to protect against destructive effects 
like SEL. Most implemented modules on the test station can also be modified or completely 
replaced to broaden its use cases and to be adaptable. 
Scripts can be used to automate the testing process, which is especially handy for fault 
injection. The final GUI appears to be working very smoothly and allows all aspects of the 
test suite to be controlled. 
Chapter 7 then briefly explores using this final system as a dedicated fault injection tool. 
One approach is to determine which DUT areas are sensitive to SEU and then to mimic that 
pattern through fault injection for out-of-beam testing that simulates real SEE tests. This 
can allow testers to apply their mitigation techniques and test them before a real SEE test. 
Should there be a problem with the implementation, it can be fixed before the SEE test. 
Otherwise, another test would have been needed to retest the fixed version. 
Another approach is to inject faults into the DUT to determine which areas are prone to 
functionality loss should an upset occur there. This allows for system weak spots to be 
identified and mitigated without any SEE sensitivity data. Areas can be identified by 
injecting faults and noting if a propagated fault is detected. Mitigation techniques can also 
be tested by focusing the injection to the mitigated area only, as in the example used. 
8.2 Answering the research questions 
This project aimed to answer several research questions. They will now be discussed and any 
answers found will be given 
8.2.1 Which COTS M CUs should the local SEE testing be focused on?  
The core of this question is investigated in Chapter 2.5.1. The conclusion was to focus on 
the STM32 Arm Cortex-M MCUs. These MCUs are similar and thus easily adaptable to 
equivalent Arm Cortex-M models from other manufactures. Chapter 2.6 and 2.7 show that 
previous research heavily tested Arm Cortex-M MCUs, and further a local satellite 
component design company showed specific interest in these MCUs. 
Answer: The Arm Cortex-M MCU range, with this project focusing on the STM32L452RE 
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8.2.2 How can effective, low -level microprocessor SEE testing be 
integrated into the iTL environment? 
The system developed in the work done from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 allows testers to easily 
integrate their DUT to the SEE test methodology created in [15]. By implementing a system 
that allows fluent communication, especially for data extraction, to find low-level upset 
locations, testers can easily interface their DUTs inside the vault from outside the vault. 
Further, SEE mitigation techniques can be tested before SEE testing through fault injection. 
This way, the tester knows what to expect from the DUT during the actual test, and can 
plan and test more effectively. 
Answer: By implementing a system that conforms to the methodology of [15], allows both 
UART and JTAG data extraction and an easy interface between the DUT inside the vault 
and the tester outside, and that can aid testers in verifying that their planned tests are 
sensible before the SEE test itself. 
8.2.3 How can tools like fault injection be used to help testers prepare for 
SEE testing and verify their mitigation techniques?  
As seen in Chapter 2.6, fault injection is often used to test systems against the unknown. 
Chapter 7 discussed using fault injection in such a way as to emulate the SEE environment. 
The tester can subject the DUT to faults injected in a known, or guessed, distribution that 
can show how the beam could affect the DUT or where weak areas are that are sensitive to 
functional loss due to upsets. Mitigation techniques can also be tested by precisely injecting 
faults into the mitigated areas. These approaches all give the tester extra insight into how 
the DUT will react when irradiated and can help guide how SEE tests are conducted to be 
more effective. 
Answer: Fault injection can be used to predict the system response of SEUs, which can aid 
testers to design effective tests and verify their mitigation techniques work properly before 
using valuable beam-time.  
8.3 Improvements and recommendations 
The current JTAG driver is very bare-bones. More complete drivers should replace it as they 
become available. The drivers developed by [67] and [68] are specifically for ST-Link V2-1 
programmers as used in this project and should be considered. 
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The system should undergo another SEE test to find more weak spots. For future SEE tests, 
it might be worthwhile also running more involved firmware to push the data extraction 
speed limits in real-world use cases. It could also be viable to expand SEE test abilities to 
accommodate more aspects of TID testing, as TID also takes place during SEE testing, and 
as testers typically will schedule TID and SEE tests together due to logistical reasons. 
The system might be improved by removing the ST-Link programmer and replacing it with 
a dedicated JTAG programmer. Dedicated JTAG programmers might be able to extract 
data quicker from the DUT, especially if they can make use of USB3.0. Also, during the SEE 
test the ST-Link programmer appeared to show more sensitivity to SEE than the DUT itself, 
though not enough data was collected to prove this distinctly. Using a dedicated JTAG 
programmer would allow larger distances between the programmer and the DUT, which 
should put the programmer further into the beam shadow. Dedicated JTAG programmers 
should also be able to expand the current implementation to all Arm Cortex-M4 processors 
and possibly the entire Arm Cortex-M range. 
Finally, if a test approach as described in Chapter 7.1 is viable, it must be explored as it 
could significantly change the way MCU SEE testing could be done. 
  







Appendix A – Fluence Data for 29 January 2020 
The following fluence report was generated by Dr A. Barnard, of Stellenbosch University, 
for the SEE test at iTL on 2020/01/29. This maps the measured fluence of the various runs 
throughout the test slot. 
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Appendix B – Final Implementation APIs 
This Appendix lists the final API implementation as it stands at the end of this project. The 
modules are shown in the figure below, and each module has specific functions that can be 
modified. Of course, even these functions can be removed and changed, but then it is up to 
the programmer to ensure all modules are still working together as needed. 
 
State M achine 
The state machine module runs in its own thread and manages the control flow of the 
program. It can parse instructions from StdIn, and then delegate to the other modules. 
Instructions are handled in a FIFO manner. 
Function Name Parameters Output Description 
report(msg) msg – the message to 
report 
None Sends a message over 
StdOut, user gets 
notified. Only use 
when important. 
status(cls, stat) cls – the class 
instance that sends 
the status 
stat – the status 
None Sends a status over 
StdOut, used by 
receiver to proceed. 
execute(json) Json – the command 
data to execute 
None Executes the json 
command as it 
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would execute a 
command received 
over StdIn. This 
allows other local 
modules to interact. 
 
UART Receive 
The UART Receive module can listen for incoming messages from an active virtual COM 
port. It can also filter the input using a user-defined filter 
Function Name Parameters Output Description 
listen(device) device – the device 
to listen for. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
If any messages are 
received from the 
device, json-format 
and print them to 
StdOut so they go 
directly to the user.  
deafen(device) device – the device 
to stop listening for. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Ignore messages 
received from device. 
filterON(filter, 
device) 
filter – the name of 
the filter to 
implement. 
device – the device 
on which input to 
apply the filter to. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Apply filter to 
messages from 
device. Can be 
coupled with 
“execute(json)” of the 
state machine to 
influence the rest of 
system. 
filterOFF(device) device – the device 
on which to stop 
applying the filter to. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Stop applying a filter 
on the device input. 
 
Logger 
The logger module organises and creates log files, and also manages the writing to them. 
This prevents multiple modules trying to write to the same file at once. This module also 
requests SFTP transfers when important data needs to be moved from the test station to 
the monitoring station. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
Function Name Parameters Output Description 
create_log() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Creates a directory 
for logging in the 
local folder, on two 
flash drives, and on 
the user PC. All runs 
will be placed in 
these folders until 
this function is run 
again. Also creates 
the base log files. 
create_run() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Creates a run file. 
Run files are used to 
group data extracted 
from the DUT in an 
easily parsable 
manner. 
log(data) data – extracted 
data to add to a run 
log 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Add data to a run 
file. 
log(detail) detail – operational 
details to log 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Log any detail that 
cannot be inside a 
run file, such as 




This module detects available virtual COM ports, connects to them, and transmits any 
messages to them via UART. Every connection has its own instance. 
Function Name Parameters Output Description 
listUART() None a list of all available 
COM ports 
Detects all available 
virtual COM ports 
connectUART(number, 
json) 
number – the index 
of the device in the 
list() output list to 
connect to. 
json – JSON data 
containing the 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Connects to the 
specified virtual 
COM port 




transmit(msg) msg – the message 
to transmit 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Transmits a 
message over the 
virtual COM port. 
 
JTAG Driver 
This module links the rest of the application to the DUT. Each DUT has its own instance, 
initialised with the connection parameters(if they are provided). 
Function Name Parameters Output Description 
listJTAG() None list of available 
JTAG devices. 
Finds and returns a 
list of available 
JTAG devices. 
connectJTAG(params) params – the 
parameters, in json, 
to connect to. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Connects to a 
specific JTAG 
device. 
read(start, size) start – start address 
to read. 
size – size of area to 
read. 
array of extracted 
data. 
Read a data chunk 
from a device, 
starting at start, 
with a width of size. 
readAll() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Extracts all data 
defined in a 
predetermined map 
to a file. 
write(address, data) address – address to 
write data to. 
data – value to write 
to data register. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Writes data to the 
device at address. 
writePattern(pattern) pattern – selected 
pattern from 
predefined list. 




pattern into the 
device. 
coreHalt() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Halts the core. 
coreResume() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Resumes the core. 
coreStep() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Steps the core (must 
be halted first). 
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getRegisters() None array of register 
values. 
Reads all the CPU 
registers. Core must 
be halted first. 
setRegister(register, 
data)) 
register – the 
register to write the 
data to. 
data – the value to 
write into the 
register. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Set a specific 
register value. Core 
must be halted first. 
 
GPIO 
This module controls the GPIO pins. Currently it is only configured to switch the power to 
DUTs on or off. Instances are initialised with a pin number. 
Function Name Parameters Output Description 
startGPIO() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Initialize the GPIO 
for use. Called when 
program starts. 
stopGPIO() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Reset the GPIO so 
that it is in default 
configuration for the 
next program to use. 
connect(pin) pin – the pin the 
instance is linked to. 
bool – status of 
operation success 
Changes the connect 
pin to the parameter 
pin. 
pinOn() None bool – status of 
operation success 
Switches pin state to 
on. 
pinOff() None bool – status of 
operation success 




The Device module links all the hardware modules (JTAG driver, UART transmit, GPIO) 
into a single instance. All functions can be called of the sub-modules simply by using their 
original names, ie. device.pinOff() will switch off its connected GPIO pin. This just makes it 
conceptually easier to manage. It does imply that all functions in the sub-modules need to 
be uniquely named.  
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